

340 BC  
THE ORATION ON THE REGULATION OF THE STATE

by Demosthenes

translated by Thomas Leland, D.D.

Notes and Introduction by Thomas Leland, D.D.

INTRODUCTION

To the Oration on the Regulation of the State

THE contests between the Macedonians and Athenians (to which we owe the most valuable remains of Demosthenes) have been explained in the notes and introductions to the Philippic orations. The reader is not now to be informed at what time, and with what success, King Philip attempted to reduce Perinthus and Byzantium. When he found himself obliged to raise the siege of Byzantium he is said to have turned his arms against Scythia. The Athenians, who were elated by the least appearance of good fortune, considered this as a flight. They were fired with the imagination of an enemy, that had so long proved formidable and successful, defeated in his designs, and this principally by the counsels and arms of Athens, retiring before their general Phocion, and forced from all attempts on Greece to retrieve the honor of his arms in parts remote and barbarous. This they considered as the happy moment for pursuing their advantages, and for reducing that ambition to just and equitable bounds, which was now, for the first time, severely mortified and disappointed.

In order to render the hostilities now meditated more formidable and effectual, the Athenians began seriously to reflect on the causes of past misfortunes, and seemed resolved to reform those corruptions and abuses which had disgraced their constitution and weakened their power.

The oppressions and severe exactions of which their allies and dependent states had lately found particular occasion to complain, and to which the necessity of their affairs had contributed, as well as the avarice of their commanders, naturally determined them to reflect on the necessity of making some effectual provision for the payment of their armies; and this as naturally determined the honest and faithful counsellors to resume the consideration of that old scandalous abuse, the theatrical distributions. Of these the reader has been sufficiently informed in the notes and introductions to the Olynthiac orations.

An assembly was therefore convened to consider the most eligible methods to provide for the public exigencies, in the least burdensome and most effectual manner; and particularly to consider the expediency of restoring their theatrical funds to the service of the army; a point which their misguided decrees had rendered so dangerous to be proposed. On this occasion was the following oration delivered; in which the orator resumes his favorite subject with his usual spirit, yet with sufficient caution: points out the corruptions of his countrymen, with their causes and consequences, and describes both the ancient and present state of Athens- Athens uncorrupted, illustrious, and fortunate, and the same state

degenerated and disgraced, with all the honest severity and indignation of a patriot.

In this oration no mention is made of Philip or his designs, of the late transactions in Greece, of the late advantages or disgraces of the Athenian arms. The orator confines himself entirely, and directs the attention of his hearers, to the points immediately under consideration; and we find that these afforded him sufficient room for the exertion of his abilities.

THE ORATION ON THE REGULATION OF THE STATE

Pronounced in the Archonship of Theophrastus, the first year  
of the Hundred and Tenth Olympiad \*(1)

MEN of Athens! As to this money, and the affairs at this time proposed to the assembly, it appears to me that a speaker may, without danger, espouse either side. By condemning those who thus distribute and exhaust the public treasure, he may gain their esteem who regard this custom as injurious to the public; or, by assenting to and encouraging these distributions, he may recommend himself to their favor whose necessities prompt them to demand these public aids. By neither party is the interest of the state considered. Their approbation or their condemnation of this custom is influenced entirely by their several circumstances, of indigence or affluence. I, on my part, shall neither oppose nor recommend it. But this I would entreat you seriously and maturely to consider, that the money now the subject of debate is of little moment; but the custom which it hath produced, of great consequence. If then these distributions \*(2) be established for those who have first respectively discharged their public offices; far from injuring, you will do the most essential service both to your country and to yourselves. But if a feast, or any other like pretence, be sufficient for demanding these sums; if the mention of any further conditions be rejected with impatience, beware lest all your regulations, how specious, how promising soever, may hereafter prove erroneous.

This I now declare as my opinion (let me not be interrupted by clamor; but hear, and then determine): That as we are now convened about receiving these distributions, so should an assembly be appointed to consider a general regulation of the state, and particularly of a provision for our military affairs; and every citizen should discover, not only a just attention to all useful measures, but a just alacrity to carry them into execution; that so, my countrymen, our hopes of good success may depend on ourselves, instead of being amused with reports of this or that man's exploits. Let all the public treasures, let all the funds for which private fortunes are now so uselessly exhausted, let all those resources which our allies afford, be equitably distributed, and effectually applied; by the soldier, to his support in time of action; by the man who hath passed the age of military duty, as a recompense for his services in the administration of justice. Let the duties of the field be discharged by yourselves, duties too important to be entrusted to others; let your armies be composed of citizens: thus let them be paid and provided. So shall they go on with vigor and success: so shall your general really command his forces; \*(3) and so shall your occupation be no longer to conduct the trials of your officers, nor the result of all your measures prove but this- an accuser, \*(4) an impeachment, and a criminal.

What then may be expected from the measures now proposed? First, that the attachment of our allies will be secured, not by garrisons, but by making their and our interests the same; then, that our generals, attended by their troops of foreigners, will no longer harass our confederates \*(5) by their depredations, without once daring to face the enemy (a conduct by which all emoluments have centred in these generals, but which hath loaded the state with odium and disgrace). On the contrary, by leading out an army composed of citizens, they shall inflict that severity on our enemies hitherto directed against our friends and allies.

But, besides these, there are other affairs which demand your personal service. A war in our own country must certainly be better supported by an army of our own citizens; and for other purposes such an army is absolutely necessary. Were it consistent with your character to sit down inactive, without the least concern or interest in the affairs of Greece, I should then use a different language. But now you affect the dignity of supreme commanders and umpires in Greece: but yet the forces to defend and to preserve this superiority you have not yet prepared, nor are solicitous to prepare. No: by your indolence and insensibility the people of Mitylene have lost their liberty: \*(6) by your indolence and insensibility the people of Rhodes have lost their liberty. But these, it may be said, were our enemies. Yet we should regard oligarchies as much more the objects of our aversion (merely on account of their constitution) than free states can be from any cause.

But I have wandered from my purpose. My advice is this: that you should be arranged in your classes; and that, by one and the same regulation, you should be entitled to receive, and obliged to act. Of these things I have spoken on former occasions, and explained the manner in which our infantry, our cavalry, in which those who are exempt from military service may be all duly regulated, and all receive their stipends fully. But that which of all things gives me the most melancholy apprehensions I shall here declare without disguise. Many and noble and important are the objects which should command your attention: yet no man hath the least respect to any one of them; all attend solely to the wretched pittance \*(7) you distribute. Such a pittance, then, they must confess, is adequate to their desert: but a just attention to the objects I have mentioned must have consequences more valuable than all the wealth of Persia—the exact regulation and appointment of a state like this, possessed of so great an infantry, of such a navy, of such a cavalry, of such revenues.

But wherefore do I mention these things? For this reason. There are men shocked at the thoughts of obliging all our citizens to serve in war; but there are none who do not readily acknowledge that it is of the utmost moment to the state to be duly regulated and perfectly provided. It is your part, therefore, to begin here, and to allow a full freedom of speech to those who would urge the importance of this point in its full force. If you be convinced that this is the proper time for considering the necessary provisions, you may command them when called to action: but should you imagine that such considerations may more properly be deferred to some future occasion, then must you be reduced to give up the time of execution to the necessary preparations.

It may have been already asked, Athenians (not by the majority of this assembly, but by certain persons who would burst with vexation should these measures be pursued), "What real advantage have we

derived from the speeches of Demosthenes? He rises when he thinks proper: he deafens us with his harangues: he declaims against the degeneracy of present times: he tells us of the virtues of our ancestors: he transports us by his airy extravagance: he puffs up our vanity; and then sits down." But could these my speeches once gain an effectual influence on your minds, so great would be the advantages conferred on my country, that were I to attempt to speak them they would appear to many as visionary. Yet still I must assume the merit of doing some service by accustoming you to hear salutary truths: and if your counsellors be solicitous for any point of moment to their country, let them first cure your ears, for they are distempered: and this, from the inveterate habit of listening to falsehoods, to everything rather than your real interests.

Thus it lately happened- let no man interrupt me; let me have a patient hearing- that some persons broke into the treasury. The speakers all instantly exclaimed, "Our free constitution is overturned: our laws are no more." And now, ye men of Athens, judge if I speak with reason. They who are guilty of this crime justly deserve to die; but by such offenders our constitution is not overturned. Again, some oars \*(8) have been stolen from our arsenal. "Stripes and tortures for the villain! Our constitution is subverted!" This is the general cry. But what is my opinion? This criminal, like the others, hath deserved to die: but, if some are criminal, our constitution is not therefore subverted. There is no man who dares openly and boldly to declare in what case our constitution is subverted. But I shall declare it. When you, Athenians, become a helpless rabble, without conduct, without property, without arms, without order, without unanimity; when neither general nor any other person hath the least respect for your decrees. When no man dares to inform you of this your condition, to urge the necessary reformation, much less to exert his efforts to effect it, then is your constitution subverted: and this is now the case.

But, O my fellow-citizens! a language of a different nature hath poured in on us, false and highly dangerous to the state. Such is that assertion that in your tribunals is your great security; that your right of suffrage is the real bulwark of the constitution. That these tribunals are our common resource in all private contests, I acknowledge: but it is by arms we are to subdue our enemies; by arms we are to defend our state. It is not by our decrees that we can conquer. To those, on the contrary, who fight our battles with success, to those we owe the power of decreeing, of transacting all our affairs, without control or danger. In arms then let us be terrible; in our judicial transactions humane.

If it be observed that these sentiments are more elevated than might be expected from my character, the observation, I confess, is just. Whatever is said about a state of such dignity on affairs of such importance should appear more elevated than any character. To your worth should it correspond, not to that of the speaker. And now I shall inform you why none of those who stand high in your esteem speak in the same manner. The candidates for office and employment go about soliciting your voices, the slaves of popular favor: to gain the rank of general is each man's great concern; not to fill this station with true manlike intrepidity. Courage, if he possesses it, he deems unnecessary; for thus he reasons: he has the honor, the renown of this city to support him; he finds himself free from oppression and control; he needs but to amuse you with fair hopes; and thus he secures a kind of inheritance in your emoluments. And he reasons

truly. But do you yourselves once assume the conduct of your own affairs, and then, as you take an equal share of duty, so shall you acquire an equal share of glory. Now your ministers and public speakers, without one thought of directing you faithfully to your true interest, resign themselves entirely to these generals. Formerly you divided into classes, in order to raise the supplies: now the business of the classes is to gain the management of public affairs. The orator is the leader: the general seconds his attempts; the three hundred are the assistants on each side; and all others take their parties and serve to fill up the several factions. And you see the consequences: this man gains a statue; this amasses a fortune: one or two command the state; while you sit down unconcerned witnesses of their success; and, for an uninterrupted course of ease and indolence, give them up those great and glorious advantages which really belong to you.

And now consider what was the conduct of our ancestors in these particulars (for if we would be taught how to act with dignity, we need not look to other countries for examples; we have had them in our own state) to Themistocles, who commanded in the sea-fight at Salamis; \*(9) to Miltiades, the general at Marathon; to many others, who surely never did such services as our present generals. They never once erected a brazen statue. These men never were such darling favorites: never were deemed superior to their fellow-citizens. No, by the gods! the Athenians of those days never would give up their share in the honor of any noble action: nor is there a man that will say, the sea-fight of Themistocles at Salamis, but of the Athenians; not the engagement at Marathon by Miltiades, but by the state. But now we are perpetually told that Timotheus took Corcyra; that Iphicrates cut off the detachment; that Chabrias gained the naval victory at Naxos; thus you seem to resign all your share in these actions by those extravagant honors which you heap on your generals.

Such was the noble conduct of our ancestors in rewarding citizens, and such is your mistaken conduct! But of honoring foreigners, what have been the methods? To Menon the Pharsalian, who supplied us with twelve talents of silver in our war at Eion, near Amphipolis, \*(10) and reinforced us with two hundred horsemen of his own dependents, our ancestors never voted the freedom of our city, but only granted certain immunities. \*(11) And in earlier times Perdiccas, who reigned in Macedon \*(12) at the time of the barbarian's invasion, who fell on the barbarians in their retreat from the slaughter of Plataea, and completed the ruin of the king, they never voted the freedom of the city; they but granted him immunities; thoroughly persuaded that the honor of being a citizen of Athens was too exalted, too illustrious to be purchased by any services. But now, my countrymen, it is exposed to common sale: the most abandoned of mankind, the slaves \*(13) of slaves are admitted to pay down the price, and at once obtain it. And such difference of conduct doth not arise from this, that you are naturally less excellent than your ancestors; but from those truly noble sentiments which they were accustomed to entertain, and which you have lost: for it is not possible that men engaged in low and grovelling pursuits can be possessed with great and generous thoughts: just as those who act with dignity and honor cannot harbor any mean and abject thought. Whatever be their course of conduct, such must men's sentiments ever prove.

And now let us take one general view of the actions performed by our ancestors and by ourselves, that by such comparison we may learn to

excel ourselves. Five-and-forty years did they govern Greece with general consent: more than ten thousand talents did they collect into our treasury: many and noble monuments did they erect, of victories by land and sea which are yet the objects of our applause: and be assured that they erected these, not to be viewed in silent wonder, but that you might be excited to emulate the virtues of those who raised them. Such was their conduct. Say, then, can we, though seated thus securely above all opposition, boast of any actions like these? Have we not lavished more than one thousand five hundred talents on every Grecian state that pleaded their distress?— and all to no purpose. Have we not exhausted all our private fortunes, all the revenues of our state, all we could exact from our confederates? The allies which we gained by arms, have they not been given up in our treaties? Yes; in these particulars it is granted that our ancestors excelled us; but there are others in which we are superior. Far from it! Shall we pursue the comparison? The edifices they have left to us, their decorations of our city, of our temples, of our harbors, of all our public structures, are so numerous and so magnificent, that their successors can make no addition. Look round you to their vestibules, their arsenals, their porticoes, and all those honors of our city which they transmitted to us: yet were the private habitations of the men of eminence in those times so moderate, so consonant to that equality, the characteristics of our constitution, that if any one of you knows the house of Themistocles, of Cimon, of Aristides, of Miltiades, or of any of the then illustrious personages, he knows that it is not distinguished by the least mark of grandeur. But now, ye men of Athens, as to public works, the state is satisfied if roads be repaired, if water be supplied, if walls be whitened, if any trifle be provided. Not that I blame those who have executed such works. No: I blame you, who can think so meanly as to be satisfied with such fruits of their administration. Then, in private life, of the men who have conducted our affairs, some have built houses not only more magnificent than those of other citizens, but superior to our public edifices; others have purchased and improved an extent of land greater than all their dreams of riches ever presented to their fancies.

And here lies the great source of these errors. Formerly, all power and authority were in the people. Happy was it for any individual if they vouchsafed him a share of honors, employments, or emoluments. But now, on the contrary, individuals are the masters of all advantages, the directors of all affairs; while the people stand in the mean rank of their servants and assistants, fully satisfied if these men vouchsafe to grant them some small share of their abundance.

To such a state have we been reduced by these means, that if a man were to peruse your decrees, and then distinctly to examine your actions, he could not persuade himself that the same people had been authors of both. Witness the decrees you made against the accursed Megareans, \*(14) who had possessed themselves of the consecrated ground; that you would march out; that you would oppose them; that you would not permit such sacrilege: witness your decrees about the Phliasian exiles; \*(15) that you would support them; that you would not abandon them to their assassins; that you would call on those of the Peloponnesians who were inclined to unite with you in their cause. These were all noble declarations; these were just; these were worthy of our state. Not so the execution. Thus your decrees serve but to discover your hostile dispositions; your enemies never feel their

effects. The resolutions of your assemblies fully express the dignity of your country; but that force which should attend these resolutions you do not possess. It is in my opinion your only alternative (and let it not raise your indignation), either to entertain sentiments less elevated, and to confine your attention to your own affairs, or to arm yourselves with greater force. If this assembly were composed of the inhabitants of some obscure and contemptible islands, I should advise you to think less highly. But as you are Athenians, I must urge you to increase your force: for it is shameful, O my countrymen! it is shameful to desert that rank of magnanimity in which our ancestors have placed us. Could we descend to such a thought, it would be impossible to withdraw our attention from the affairs of Greece. We have ever acted greatly and nobly: those who are our friends it would be scandalous to desert: our enemies we cannot trust; nor must we suffer them to become powerful. In a word, we see in this city that the men who have engaged in the public administration, even when they wish to retire, cannot resign their charge. This is your case; you are the ministers in Greece.

This, then, is the sum of what hath now been offered. Your speakers never can make you either bad or good: you can make them whatever you please. You are not directed by their opinions; for they have no opinion but what your inclinations dictate. It is your part, therefore, to be careful that your inclinations be good and honorable; then shall all be well. Your speakers either must never give pernicious counsels, or must give them to no purpose, when such counsels have no longer any influence in this assembly. \*(16)

#### NOTES

To the Oration on the Regulation of the State

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\* (1) The fatal consequences of lavishing the public revenues on spectacles and entertainments had been long and severely experienced. Yet still numbers were found in the assembly who, from private motives, either of interest, or to recommend themselves to the lower part of the citizens, pleaded in favor of this abuse, and found plausible arguments to urge in its favor. These and their opposers seem to have already debated the present point with considerable heat and violence, and to have been supported by their respective partisans, not with that decorum or temper which, perhaps, is sometimes found in less numerous assemblies. Hence the appearance of moderation in this exordium; which in the present disposition of the people was probably necessary in order to obtain the orator an audience. And it may in general be observed, that although the eloquence of Demosthenes be commonly, and very justly, compared to the irresistible lightning, storm, or torrent; yet such similitudes are not to be understood too strictly; for, on all necessary occasions, he appears a consummate master of the gentle arts of insinuation. He thunders and lightens indeed; yet sometimes (if the allusion be warrantable) "half his strength he puts not forth." Nor, in effect, does he ever give a free and full course to his energy until he has prepared his hearers to receive the impression.

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\* (2) I have here endeavored to express what I take to be the intent and meaning of the orator, from comparing the passage with others of the like import in the Olynthiac orations. To propose to the assembly that the theatrical money (as it was called) should be applied to other purposes, was, by the law of Eubulus, declared a

capital offence. Demosthenes therefore advises, not that this money should be alienated to the payment of their armies, but that all citizens should receive their distributions as usual; yet, at the same time, discharge all their respective offices whether civil or military, without further salary or pay; and that such only as had thus discharged, or were ready to discharge, these offices should be entitled to the public distributions. The two proposals are, in effect and reality, the same, but different in form; and this difference was sufficient for eluding the severity of the law.

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\* (3) In the Philippic orations we find notice frequently taken of the misconduct of the Athenian generals, in employing their forces not conformably to their instructions, but in expeditions neither appointed nor approved by their country. This Demosthenes ever affects to ascribe principally to disobedience and want of discipline in the foreign forces, and to the necessities of the general, which obliged him to procure by arms that provision for his soldiers which the state neglected to supply.

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\* (4) In the original, Such a man, the son of such a man, hath impeached such a person: O deina tou deinos, ton deina eiseggeilen. Alluding to the usual form of the bill or motion preferred to the assembly, or to the judges, on such occasions. I have here chosen to adhere to the interpretation of Wolfius, as sufficiently warranted by the original, as most pertinent, and certainly most spirited.

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\* (5) When the Athenians sent to collect their tribute from the dependent islands, they frequently employed an admiral, attended with such a navy as proved both a burden and a terror to the islanders. When Phocion was appointed to sail with twenty ships on such an occasion, "Why such a force?" said this humane Athenian. "If I am to meet enemies, it is insufficient; if I am sent to friends, a single vessel will serve." And even those allies who found themselves obliged to implore the assistance of the Athenians against their enemies frequently experienced more miserable effects from the oppression and rapine of their auxiliaries than from the arms of their assailants. So notorious and odious was the avarice of Chares, that when he led an army to the relief of Byzantium (a little before the date of this oration), the Byzantines shut their gates against him.

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\* (6) This change of the government at Mitylene, as it could not convey any instruction to posterity, has been passed over in silence by all the ancients except Demosthenes: so that we are ignorant of the manner in which it was effected (and how far the Athenians were really to blame in not preventing it).

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\* (7) Literally, to the two oboli; that is, five cents, the sum distributed to the poorer citizens for their support, and for the purchase of their seats in the theatre; and, small as this largess was, yet, as the number of such citizens was great, and as the distribution seems to have been made daily, the treasury must have been considerably exhausted by it. Nor are we warranted to suppose that the people always confined their demands to this sum. Entertainments, processions, and religious ceremonies afforded pretences for still further demands.

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\* (8) We cannot well suppose that the depredations made in their naval stores were really so slight and inconsiderable as they are represented in these extenuating terms. A design had lately been concerted of a very momentous and alarming nature, and an attempt made on the naval stores at Athens, which Demosthenes himself labored with the utmost zeal to detect and punish. A man named Antipho had been for some time considered as an Athenian citizen; till, by an examination of the registers, he was found to be really a foreigner; was accordingly deprived of all the privileges of a native, and driven with some ignominy from the city. Enraged at this disgrace, he went off to Philip, and to him proposed to steal privately into Athens, and to set fire to the arsenal. The Macedonian, who was neither delicate in the choice of his instruments, nor in the means of distressing his enemies, listened readily to the proposal of this hireling, and by bribes and promises encouraged him to the attempt. Antipho repaired to Athens, and was lodged in the port, ready to put his enterprise in execution, when Demosthenes, who received timely intimation of this black design, flew to the Piraeus, and seized, and dragged the delinquent before an assembly of the people. Here the clamors of the Macedonian party were so violent, that the accusation was slighted, and Antipho dismissed without the formality of a trial. He departed, triumphing in his escape, to pursue his designs with greater confidence and security. But the court of Areopagus, whose peculiar province it was to take the cognizance of all matters of treason against the state, caused him to be again seized and examined. Torture forced from him a full confession of his guilt, and sentence of death was passed, and executed on him. This account we have from the oration on the Crown. And the detection of so dangerous a design might have quickened the vigilance of the people, and exasperated their resentment against any the least attempts made on their military stores.

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\* (9) These are the very expressions of the original: and although the common metonymical phrase, who gained the victory at Salamis, might appear less uncouth, and be more familiar to a modern ear, yet I should have thought it unpardonable in the translation, as it is a mode of speaking which Demosthenes studiously avoids: and, indeed, had he been betrayed into it, he must have exposed himself to all the ridicule of his acute and observant audience; for, in the very next sentence, he condemns it as highly derogatory to the honor of his country.

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\* (10) This war at Eion, near Amphipolis, I am bold to assert, was the same with that so particularly described by Thucydides, in the eighth, ninth, and tenth years of the Peloponnesian War, when the Lacedaemonians, under the command of Brasidas, opposed the Athenians in this country, although the historian, who confined himself to the transactions of greatest importance, makes no mention of this assistance afforded to the Athenians by Menon the Pharsalian. This Menon I take to be the same with the Thessalian of that name who, in the fourth year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad, led a body of forces to the assistance of Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes, according to Diodorus and Xenophon. The circumstances of his supplying the Athenians with money, and giving them a body of horse, exactly agree to two particulars in the character of that Menon whom Xenophon describes; that it was his custom to court the friendship of the powerful, that they might screen him from the punishment due to his

infamous practices; and that he constantly kept in his service a large body of forces ready to act as he directed.

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\*(11) A manner of doing honor to these men which, at the same time, expressed a high sense of the dignity of their own city; for it supposed that these eminent personages might find it necessary to take up their residence for some considerable time at Athens, as sojourners: and, in order to understand the nature of these immunities, we must attend to the situation of those metoikoi, or sojourners; so were these foreigners called who settled at Athens by permission of the Areopagus. Here they were allowed to follow their occupations without disturbance; but had no share in the government; were not entrusted with public offices, nor voted in the assembly. They were obliged to the performance of certain duties; as in the festival celebrated in honor of Minerva, called Panathenaea, the men were obliged to carry the skaphai, or little ships, which were the signs of their foreign extraction, while the women bore the udriai, vessels of water, and the skiadeia, umbrellas, to defend the freewomen from the weather. This last custom, indeed, was introduced in the insolence of the Athenian prosperity, after the defeat of the Persians. Besides this the men paid an annual tribute of twelve drachmae. The women who had no sons paid six. Such as had sons that paid were excused. And this tribute was exacted not only of those that dwelt in Athens, but of all that settled themselves in any town of Attica. This tribute, by the interposition of Themistocles, was for a time remitted, but seems to have been restored in consequence of his disgrace; and, on any failure of payment, the delinquent was liable to be seized and sold as a slave. Such of these sojourners as had been remarkably serviceable to the public were honored, by edict, with an immunity from all impositions and duties, except such as were required of the freeborn citizens. Hence this honor was called isoteleia, and ateleia (the expression of the text). To foreigners of eminence such immunities might have extended even to an exemption from certain duties to which citizens themselves were obliged; for immunities of this kind were frequently granted, so as to occasion complaints and remonstrances.

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\*(12) According to Herodotus, Alexander, the son of Amyntas, was king of Macedon at the time of the Persian War: and therefore we may suppose, with the Italian commentator, that this Perdiccas was one of the royal family, and governed one of those districts into which Macedon was divided in the earlier times. Nor are we to wonder that this action of the Macedonian has been passed over in silence by the historians, as it was not very considerable when compared with the great events of the Persian War.

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\*(13) The freedom of the city was, by the constitution of Athens, conferred only by the voices of the people; nor was their act valid unless confirmed in a subsequent assembly by the votes of more than six thousand Athenians, by ballot (as we learn from the oration of Demosthenes against Neaera); but now their poverty had made them much less delicate. And we learn from Athenaeus that they had about this time conferred the freedom of their city (this compliment, in former times, scarcely vouchsafed to kings and potentates) on two men, whose only pretence of merit was, that their father had been famous for improving the art of cookery. Such a scandalous prostitution of their honors fully justifies all the severity of Demosthenes.

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\*(14) This instance of the impiety of the Megareans, of whom Demosthenes here affects to speak with so much detestation, probably happened about the time, and was the occasion of the embassy of Anthemocritus, of whom mention is made in Philip's Letter to the Athenians.

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\*(15) As this affair is not mentioned in history, and but slightly hinted at by Demosthenes, it requires some pains to investigate it. The Phliasians had ever been in open or secret enmity with the Argives; while the one endeavored to support their independency, the other to reduce their city, which they regarded as part of their own territory. In the third year of the hundred and first Olympiad certain Phliasians who had been banished formed a conspiracy with some kinsmen who still continued in the city, in order to betray it to the Argives. It was attacked vigorously by night, and the enemy, with the utmost difficulty repelled. This his attempt exasperated each party, and produced various quarrels and hostilities. And whether these were suspended, or continued down to the date of this oration, it seems to admit of no doubt that the Argives and Arcadians, supported by the king of Macedon, made war on the Phliasians, restored the exiles, and drove out those citizens who had opposed their interest; and that these citizens, thus oppressed and expelled, implored the assistance of the Athenians, and received those magnificent promises and decrees which the orator here mentions.

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\*(16) These representations of Demosthenes were so far successful, that, early in the following year the assembly repealed that scandalous law of Eubulus which denounced death against any person who should propose the alienation of the theatrical appointments; and the orator himself had the honor of introducing a decree for applying them to the military service: to which the people consented when it was too late to derive any considerable advantages from this reformation.

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THE END OF THE ORATION ON THE REGULATION OF THE STATE