INTRODUCTION

1.1 Prefatory Statement

The past decade had been a critical period for civil-military relations and, particularly, civil control in the Philippines. For the first time in the country's history, the relationship between the civilian political leadership and the military was tested to the limits. Specifically, a reformist sector of the military triggered a "people revolution" in February 1986 that led to the fall of Marcos and the subsequent installation of Aquino as President. Soon afterwards, a series of abortive coups took place. The latest and most serious coup attempt of December 1989 could have succeeded if not for the intervention of a foreign power.

The period, thus, marked the rise of the military as a dominant force in national politics, particularly its crucial role in the country's democratic transition from authoritarian rule. It was observed that 30 former authoritarian countries have become democracies since 1974 that doubled the number of democratic states. Huntington refers to the recent victory of democracy as forming the "Third Wave" of democratization, with the two previous waves occurring from 1828 to 1926 and from 1943 to 1962. He notes two significant observations: (a) that democratization is a "Matter of two steps forward or two steps backward"; and (b) that history "does not sail ahead in a straight line, but when skilled and determined leaders are at the helm, it does move forward."

The return of the Philippines to democratic rule in 1986 had been unique because of the key roles and close collaboration of the civilian and the military. But the process of democratic transition and consolidation suffered a setback because of a series of coup attempts.

What went wrong during the democratic transition under the Aquino administration? Why is it that some military factions are involved in coups? What is the future of civil-military relations in the Philippines? As posed by Huntington, "Could this democratic breakthrough only be a stage in a cycle that leads back to authoritarianism?"

Effective responses to these questions would require an understanding of the military and their role in society, most particularly their relationship vis-a-vis the political authorities.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This is a study of current civil-military relations in the Philippines. Specifically, it focuses on the perceptions of an influential sector of the Philippine military: the active-duty Philippine Military Academy-trained officers. The study intends to provide answers to the following basic questions:

1. How do they perceive the current state of civil-military relations and civil control? How do they perceive their involvement in politics?

2. What are their perceptions of the government's policies and performance that relate directly or indirectly with the military's mission of contributing to national security?

3. What are the implications of their perceptions of civilian control and broader civil-military relations?

4. What policy measures might be considered to enhance civil-military relations? How can civil control be enhanced ideally with voluntary military support?

1.3 Significance of the Study

The need to monitor the military perceptions is vital to our policymakers. It provides them with a relevant feedback mechanism on how the military relate to policies that directly or indirectly affect them. With such information, the necessary policies may be formulated and implemented to address legitimate military

grievances and demands; thus, averting direct military interventions in politics.

This study may be considered a departure from previous studies on the military in that it focuses on the perceptions of military officers themselves. In stressing the importance of focusing on military perceptions, Lissak views that "the propensity to intervene is dependent upon the officer corps's interpretation of developments outside the military establishment."

Also, this study is a continuation of past researches on the military that the writer had the opportunity to be involved with. But unlike these researches that made use of non-random sampling, this study employs a representative random sampling. Thus, it could be the first survey of the military using this method with active-duty PMA officers as respondents.

1.4 Scope of the Study

This is a study of civil-military relations and civil-control. However, it focuses on the interrelationship of three main variables: regime legitimacy, military disposition and opportunity to intervene, and military intervention.

This study uses data generated through a survey of 500 officers selected by random sampling from a population of 3000 active-duty PMA-trained officers.

The survey focused on PMA officers for the following reasons:

1. An ideal survey of the military would consider all AFP personnel involving 152,000 officers and enlisted men. Another approach would be to consider the officer corps consisting of 14,000 officers. Either alternative poses formidable problems of manageability as well as adequacy of resources available to researchers.

2. The choice of active-duty PMA-trained officers may be further justified as they constitute the core of the regular officer corps of the AFP. They also occupy major command and staff positions particularly at the higher levels of the AFP. For these reasons, these officers may be said to influence to a large degree the perceptions of the AFP as a whole.

3. Actual military interventions against the Marcos and Aquino regimes were led by PMA graduates. As discussed in section 2.2 of this study, a major reason for this is their generally middle class socioeconomic and superior educational backgrounds which tend to make them politically aware and sensitive.

1.5 Survey of Related Literature

As a background to the analytical framework of this paper, the literature on civil-military relations is presented. Initially, the study discusses the theory and approaches of civil-military relations and civil control. This is followed by a presentation of specific studies on the subject here and abroad.

1.51 Civil-Military Relations:

Theory and Approaches

In a comprehensive review of the concepts of civil-military relations, Lovell identifies three approaches: the traditional or formal-legalistic, modern, and issue area approach.

Influenced by the post-World War II approach to politics which focused on formal institutions and legal authority, the traditional or formal-legalistic approach on civil-military relations deal with the threat posed by the military to civil government. Thus, the solution mainly rests on civil control of the military through constitutional checks and balances. In line with the behavioral movement, Lovell criticizes this approach in that it ignores important informal sources of interactions and power. He notes Dahl observation that "formal constitutional prescriptions may become undermined or obsolete in practice and - perhaps, more importantly - ignores informal and internalized constraints that often in politics are more important than formalized constraints." Lovell identifies other critics of this approach that include Huntington, Millis, Laswell, Vagts, and Lyons.

Although considered as an analytical improvement of the formal-legalistic approach, the modern approach has its shortcomings. These limitations include: a parochial American focus, perpetuation of the view that the "civil" and "military" view as sharply differentiated, and an a priori approach that neglect important empirical data. Lovell then suggests an alternative framework, an issue area approach, that is more comparative and dynamic and one that can accommodate both empirical and normative analysis. Specifically, this approach is relevant for political systems that have complex structures and values, blurred civil-military boundaries, and interventionist military.

involvement

Civil control means that "basic decisions relating to military forces must be made by politically accountable officials." This means that in a democracy, all basic policy which includes military policy must be made by officials elected by and responsible to the people with whom sovereignty rests.

Civil control, thus, refers to the subordination of the military to civilian authority. In operational terms, civilian control means the ability of the civilian political authority to limit the military to function within bounds laid down by the Constitution and the laws. An indicator of civilian control is where civilian political leaders effectively make policy decisions and authoritatively determine the areas of military competence, with the military accepting such decisions.

Civil control may be better understood as it relates to the military involvement in politics. Should the military be viewed as apolitical or very much involved in politics? This question has been debated on since the late 1950s when the relevant professional literature biased itself initially in favor of an apolitical or even anti-political military. Since the early 1970s, however, the focus of the literature has changed toward viewing the military as a naturally politically involved and crucial institution.

Welch, in fact, asserts that all armed forces are involved in politics, with the nature of their involvement being "a question not of whether, but of how much and of what kind." The specific nature of the military's involvement depends largely on the perceived legitimacy of the civilian government.

Schematically, Welch presents a continuum of the military involvement in politics:

Military Military Military Military

Influence -- Participation -- Control -- Control

(civil (with (without

control) partners) partners)

As adopted in most Western, democratic states and in some developing countries, military influence is considered the "normal" form of civil control. Although the military is not excluded from politics, its involvement is limited. Specifically, only senior ranking officers are involved in politics. Also, civilian and political roles are clearly delineated with officers keeping away from the latter. At the same time, political influence is exercised through conventional channels. Thus, direct contacts are allowed only between civilian political and military leaders at the top positions of the military hierarchy.

Another stage or condition of civil control according to the Welch schematic is one where there is military participation beyond simple military influence. Here, the military is directly or indirectly involved in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions. This usually happens in regimes that are not so stable. In this regard, civilian political leaders try to coopt the military leaders to provide a semblance of stability and support. Under military control, civilian control disappears, with the armed forces deciding the basic issues. Military control may either be done with or without partnerships with civilian leaders.

The literature on civil-military relations views two methods of strengthening civil control: external control by means of legitimate, effective, and widely-supported political institutions; and internal control provided through military professionalism.

External civilian control over the military in a liberal democratic setting usually consists of legal prescriptions as well as political and administrative arrangements. Specifically, control takes the forms of: "vesting of command responsibilities in the civilian head of state who becomes the commander-in-chief of the armed forces; powers vested in the legislature such as investigative power and power to declare war and states of emergency; and general budgetary supervision."

Internal civilian control provided by military professionalism is a subject of contrasting viewpoints between two noted scholars. Huntington proposed an apolitical and neutral military profession that is relatively isolated from society. On the other hand, Janowitz suggested a politically sensitive military profession that is integrated with the society.

As for the literature on civilian-military relations in Southeast Asia, there have been two recent compilations of country studies on this subject.

One is Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia. It focuses on the military role in politics as well as on the broad aspects of civilian-military relations of Southeast Asian states. Although published in 1984 and, thus, do not include recent political development particularly in the Philippines, it presents, however, some interesting findings. Based on endogenous and exogenous factors of military intervention, it classifies two types of states in Southeast Asia: those states where the military plays an active role in politics or has carried out a coup (Burma, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Laos) and those where the military has not directly involved itself in politics (Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines). Two explanations are presented for the disparity of these two types of states. An important factor for later civil-military relations is the nature of the struggle for independence. Where the nationalist struggle was more peaceful and gradual, civil supremacy predominated as in Singapore and Malaysia. But in countries where the nationalist struggle was relatively more violent, the military's role has been dominant and substantive as in Indonesia, Vietnam, Burma and Laos.

Another factor is that "the politicization of the officer corps is a function upon the strength and cohesion of the civilian elites."

Where the civilian elites are strong and cohesive as in Singapore and Malaysia, the role of the military is limited or circumscribed. But where the civilian elites are weak and divided as in Burma, Thailand and Indonesia, the military plays a pre-eminent role.

The other book is Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia, which examines the role of the military in the political stability and development in Southeast Asian states.

The case study on the Philippine military was written by Miranda and this writer. It is based on a survey of military officers who were undergoing schooling in the DND and AFP training institutions. Conducted a few months before the major coup attempt of August 1987, the survey revealed the following military sentiments:

(a) They are involved in protecting a government whose leaders do not appear to trust them enough, nor to provide them with enough resources to wage a successful campaign against intractable subversives and who even appear to be indifferent to the urgent needs of military men while favoring rebels with conciliatory policies.

(b) They must court the support of the citizenry, enough of whom might be appreciative of the military, through campaigns that military men traditionally have not been well trained for, using military resources which other civilian agencies could have contributed to building up or whose depletion the same agencies could have minimized by not making the military the lead agency in counterinsurgency.

(c) They encounter hostility from both local and national government officials who facilitate the build-up of insurgent forces in the country.

(d) They are unable to exert enough influence on policy-making especially in the area of counterinsurgency and other security areas.

(e) They are being made to fight a war with too many fronts, with too few resources, too many constraints, with not enough decisive leadership and, until lately,lacking moral support from many government officials whom the military is tasked to protect.

(f) Finally, unable to trust most civilian agencies and civilian officials and beset with quite a bit of demoralization within the military, they must maintain their confidence in their military superiors, most of the latter being equally capable as civilian officials even in the management of civilian offices.

The academic literature on the Philippine military has grown in recent years. An earlier study on the military field was done by Hernandez who dwelt on the extent of civilian control of the military from 1946 to 1976. In this study Hernandez viewed the role of the military as having expanded from influence to participation particularly when martial law was declared in 1972. She also identified the various critical environmental and institutional factors affecting civilian-military relations in the country. These factors involve civil-military environmental variables, intrinsically military variables, and military corporate interests. Miranda in recent articles on the Philippine military, however, traced its politicization to the "general trend toward mass politicization in Third-World countries and the involvement of their military establishments in national political management after the end of World War II." Using an ongoing study that generated a demographic data base of 7000 PMA cadets from classes 1951 to 1990, he is inclined to believe that military politicization started even before Marcos declared martial law in 1972. This is shown by a trend in recruitment of cadets who come from generally middle-class families. These cadets are mostly with college backgrounds and they come from the best universities and colleges in the country.

Civil control is a provision enshrined in the Philippine Constitution. It states that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military." One of the framers of the Constitution, Bernas clarifies that the provision does not speak of civilian supremacy but of civilian authority. He cites two elements that are needed for civilian supremacy to survive: (a) a civilian government that is both legitimate and credible; and (b) an armed force of the highest ethical professionalism. He emphasized that without one or the other, civilian supremacy cannot survive. Without legitimacy or credibility of the civilian government, the military will rise as "protector of the people and the State." Without a professional armed forces, the military will only be the oppressor and not a protector or preserver of peace.

Besides the survey conducted by Miranda and this writer in April-May 1987, there have been other surveys on the military in recent years. This include the Laurel survey after the August 28, 1987 coup attempt and this writer's masteral thesis study at NDCP in May in 1988.

A survey conducted by Vice-President Salvador Laurel among military personnel, immediately after the August 1987 coup attempt, confirmed the findings of the Miranda-Ciron survey of military demoralization. Some reasons for their disenchantment include perceptions that: the government had not shown much concern for the soldiers, the Presidential Commission on Human Rights had pro-communist bias which hindered the counterinsurgency operations, the release of top communist leaders only benefited the insurgents, the government had displayed a double standard of justice by being soft on communist rebels while being hard on the mutineers, some local Officers-in-Charge (OICs) were not assisting the military in this fight against the communist rebels, and some foreign missionaries and religious organizations were overtly supporting the CPP/NPA.

A follow-up study was conducted by this writer in May 1988 for his masteral study at NDCP on a broader subject involving national problems and issues. The findings of this study showed that the respondents reacted positively to government policies after the August 28, 1987 coup attempt. Although appreciating the increase in their salaries and benefits, the military continued to be concerned with counterinsurgency problems as well as with general and more comprehensive political and economic issues. It was also found out that the respondents were a more homogenous entity than was indicated by past and current treatments that the military is severely divided or factionalized.

1.6 Hypothesis

As a general rule, based on the findings in the literature of civilian-military relations, the military tend to inhibit themselves from intervening in politics.

It is hypothesized, however, that when a government loses its legitimacy, the disposition and opportunity of the military to intervene in politics tend to increase which may result in military intervention.

1.7 Analytical Framework and

Methodology

The analytical framework initially identifies the principal variables used and how they relate to each other. This is followed by a presentation of the specific indicators and measures as well as the methods and procedures used in the study.

1.71 Overview

To be able to explain adequately the dynamics of current civil-military relations in the Philippines, this study uses as an analytical framework two basic concepts: legitimacy and military intervention.

Specifically, this study adopts primarily the: (a) concept of legitimacy by Friedrich, which was also adopted by Agpalo in his analysis of the Aquino administration; and (b) concept of military intervention by Finer.

Conceptually, this study links three major variables: the low legitimacy of the civilian regime as the independent variable, military intervention as the dependent variable, and the disposition and opportunity to intervene as intervening variables. The relationship of these variables to each other is presented in figure 1.1. Thus, it is posited that low regime legitimacy provides the military the disposition and opportunity to intervene resulting, finally, in military intervention.

According to Finer, the disposition and/or opportunity to intervene may lead to varying types of overt military intervention such as blackmail and displacement or supplantment of the civilian regime. In this regard, Finer focuses on disposition and opportunity to intervene as the primary independent variables that cause military intervention, the dependent variable.

This study, on the other hand, highlights on the effects of low legitimacy (the independent variable) to both the military disposition and opportunity to intervene (the intervening variables). The latter which may or may not lead to overt military intervention (dependent variable).

It is the objective of this study, therefore, to attempt an empirical test, through a perception survey of an influential group of military officers. This is based on the thesis that low regime legitimacy provides the military the disposition and opportunity to intervene in politics that may, ultimately, lead to overt military intervention.

To achieve the purpose of this study, operational indicators and measures will be made on the major concepts used which is the subject of the succeeding sections.

1.72 Conceptual Definition

and Indicators

The argument that the failure of civilian regimes provides the motive and opportunity for military intervention has been espoused by noted writers on civil-military relations. Along with Finer, these writers include Nordlinger and Crouch. A lucid explanation for this thesis is presented by Crouch:

It is often argued that military intervention in politics only takes place when civilian governments prove unable to govern effectively. Rarely, if ever, does the army take over simply to fulfil its own ambitions. Even when the military is already politically oriented and its officers politically ambitious, military intervention normally follows the failure of civilian governments to preserve political stability and achieve satisfactory growth. This failure leads to a loss of legitimacy which makes them susceptible to violent change. The failure of civilian regimes thus provides not only a motive for intervention but also the opportunity. Conversely, a strong, effective civilian government which successfully

maintains its legitimacy seems virtually immune to the possibility of a military coup.

Legitimacy may be generally defined as:

a condition of positive valuation, validity, and acceptance enjoyed by individual rulers, political institutions and movements, and by systems of authority, by reason of the accordance of such rulers, institutions, movements, and systems of authority with some law, principle, or source of authorization.

In political science, legitimacy has a second level or a more specific range of meanings. It designates an important action of a sovereign and this is "the condition of being in accordance with law or principle requiring acceptance of the claims of sovereign power." In the words of Friedrich, legitimacy is "a very particular kind of consensus which concerns the question of the right or title to rule or to govern." It is this consensus that grants the political leadership with authority, respect and acceptance. Lipset further describes legitimacy as:

the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves and considered right and proper... the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.

In his analysis of the legitimacy of the Aquino government, Agpalo classifies two types of legitimacy: civil and performance. Civil legitimacy is based on the consent of the people as advocated by Locke and Rousseau. As the principle of modern constitutional and representative government, civil legitimacy was adopted by the Philippines in the 1935, 1973, and 1987 constitutions. Performance legitimacy is based on the ability of the government to govern. In defining performance legitimacy, Agpalo draws inspiration from Friedrich who cites that one way to achieve legitimacy is through "performance or success legitimacy," particularly through "success in war, and the maintenance of prosperity, order, peace." This paper adopts the above concept of legitimacy. Civil legitimacy, operationalized as consent of the people, has election and plebiscite as main indicators. Performance legitimacy, which means the ability of the civilian government to govern, is determined primarily through opinion or perception survey of government performance.

This study, therefore, makes use of the perception survey to find out the civil and performance legitimacy of the Aquino administration. The indicators of civil legitimacy will be determined primarily through: (a) the perceptions of the respondents on the trustworthiness of government personalities and institutions; and (b) the results of respondents' participation in elections and referenda. On the other hand, performance legitimacy will be indicated by: (a) the respondents' perceptions of the performance of principal government personalities and institutions; and (b) their performance of certain national problems and issues.

This study primarily adopts the framework of Finer on military intervention, which is defined as "the armed forces' substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities."

Military intervention is considered a product of two sets of forces: the disposition and opportunity to intervene (the intervening variables in this study).

The military disposition to intervene will have three indicators: the motive, mood, and self-divisions of the military. The motive will be categorized and measured in terms of the military perceptions of national, corporate and individual self-interests. The mood will be measured in terms of their grievances vis-a-vis the civilian regime. Self-divisions will be tested by their homogeneity and heterogeneity of the respondents.

The opportunity or occasion to intervene is primarily dictated by conditions in the society.

In justifying its dominant role in military intervention and in response to a reviewer's comment of the earlier edition of his book that it was a "most un-military book", Finer quotes Huntington:

The most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military, but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment, but the political and institutional structure of the society .... The causes which produce military intervention in politics ... lie not in the nature of the group but in the structure of society. In particular, they lie in the absence or weakness of effective political institutions in the society.... [There is an] absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group action ... social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions; no corps of professional leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediary to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts.

The opportunity to intervene will be indicated by the subjective views of the respondents on the probable occasion for military intervention. Also, the objective conditions of the society based on economic, social, and political indicators during the period of study will also be availed of.

In sum, this study attempts to test Finer's propositions of these subjective and objective factors of military intervention based on four possible situations:

1.73 Design and Procedures

The design may be considered as exploratory. It is an effort to attempt probably the first randomized or representative survey of an influential group of Philippine military officers.

This study involved the systematic collection of perception data reflecting on the military view of civil-military relations. The gathering of the data is done through a self-administered survey questionnaire.

The survey population consists of the active-duty Philippine Military Academy-trained officers of about 3,000 officers consisting of 23 classes graduated from 1958 to 1990.

The complete list of PMA officers in the active service was generated based on the files of the PMA Alumni Association, the AFP Computer Center, and the offices of the deputy staff for personnel of the four branches of service (PA, PC, PAF and PN).

A sample of 500 active officers or 16.7% of the concerned population was taken as respondents based on attributes of the branch of service and rank (see chart 1.2 and table 3.1).

The sampling procedure took several steps. First, the PMA officers were categorized by branch of service and rank. Second, the sample number for each category was determined based on its proportional representation with the AFP regular officer corps. And finally, based on the number of sample for each category, the list for the sample respondents was taken randomly through the table of random numbers.

Categorized by rank variable, the sample respondents are proportionally represented by the: general rank (92%), colonel (10%), lieutenant colonel (7%), major (7%), captain (27%), first lieutenant (27%), and second lieutenant (19%).

On the other hand, sample respondents by branch of service have these proportions: Philippine Army (40%), Philippine Constabulary (30%), Philippine Air Force (13%), and Philippine Navy (18%).

The questionnaires were then provided the sample respondents. The survey period was scheduled for five months from September 1, 1990 to January 30, 1991.

The question items of the survey questionnaires generally cover the various aspects of civil-military relations and particularly focusing on regime legitimacy and military intervention. Some question items were taken from the previous survey studies on the military. The purpose is to be able to compare the results of these surveys and draw meaningful inferences on them. Similarly, a few items were adopted from the latest survey questions of the Social Weather Station to be able to compare the PMA officers' responses with the national population and, particularly, with Metro Manila residents.

The questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part asked the respondent on some personal-history data while the second part asked about his opinion, feeling and belief on the various aspects of civil-military relations. The questionnaire was primarily close-ended. To ascertain the intensity of the respondent's conviction or feeling, the questionnaire was asked to check from four- to six-graded scale including neutral and "don't know" responses.

The second part of the questionnaire comprised eleven sections touching on the following topics: (1) importance of national security and development issues; (2) trustworthiness: institutions; (3) trustworthiness: personalities; (4) performance: institutions; (5) performance: personalities; (6) perceptions on selected national issues; (7) major grievances against the Aquino admistration; (8) major grievances as a basis for coup against the Aquino administration; (9) threats to national security and stability; (10) performance of government on selected issues; and (11) perception of their children joining the military.

The questionnaire was pretested on 28 active-duty PMA-trained officers of various ranks and branches of service. Based on the results of the pretest, the questionnaire was slightly revised and corrections were made particularly on its length as well as the phrasing and sequence of questions.

The questionnaire is distributed through arial and mail to the 500 randomly-identified officers (from a list of about 3000 PMA-trained officers) who are generally dispersed in office and field assignments all over the country. In this regard, the Metro Manila liaison offices of the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary afford convenient arial services to respondents field assignments particularly those with the seven army divisions and the twelve constabulary regional commands.

The processing of the survey data was handled by the Data Processing Section of the School of Economics, University of the Philippines.

This study will primarily use frequency and frequency distributions analyses. A rationale for this method is expressed by Kerlinger:

[Frequency] Distributions, like graphs have probably been little used in the behavioral sciences and education. The study of relations and testing of hypotheses are almost automatically associated with correlations and comparison of averages. The use of distributions is considered less often. Some research problems, however, can be solved better by using distribution analysis.

The large number of question items in this study makes frequency and frequency distributions analyses a more suitable method to use. A frequency mean index is constructed. The index measure will be scored in that 100% will be the highest score representing a most favorable attitude and 0% as the lowest score representing the least favorable attitude. Also, the index measure will be divided into five equal parts. The highest fifth representing a most favorable attitude will also be considered as a positive norm. On the other hand, the lowest fifth representing the least favorable attitude will be considered a negative norm.

To determine further the intensity and direction of the perception of the respondents towards certain issues, the margin rating is taken. It is arrived at by taking the difference between the favorable attitude and the unfavorable attitude scores. For example the margin of trust rating is the difference between very much/much trust and little/very little trust.

Other statistical tools, primarily chi-square and gamma, are used particularly in determining the correlation of key variables. Through these statistical measures and tests, the significance, strength and direction of the relationship of the main variables are determined. Also, chi-square is used for the homogeneity tests among rank, service and ethnicity groups.

Analysis, in this study, is defined and interpreted as:

The categorizing, ordering, manipulating, and summarizing of data to obtain answers to research questions. The purpose of analysis is to reduce data to intelligible and

interpretable form so that the relations of research problem can be studied and tested. A primary purpose of statistics, for example, is to manipulate and summarize numerical data and to compare the obtained results with chance expectations.

Interpretation, as a result of analysis, makes inferences and draws conclusion about the relationship of the research studied. There are two types of interpretation. The first method is a narrow and frequent use of the term interpretation and refers to the relations within the research study and its data. In this regard, interpretation and analysis "are intertwined ... as one almost automatically interprets as one analyzes." The second method seeks a broader meaning of the research data by comparing the results and inferences drawn in the first method to theory and other research results. In other words, the meaning and implications are sought "between one's research results and conclusions either of one's own or of other researchers.

1.8 Organization of the Study

This study follows the above format of analysis and interpretation. The next four chapters (Chapters 3 to 6) will be strictly an analysis and simple interpretation of the research study and its data. One chapter each will be devoted to an analysis and simple interpretation of the main variables used in the study: regime legitimacy (Chapter 3), disposition to intervene (Chapter 4), and opportunity to intervene (Chapter 5). A deeper analysis using statistical tools will be dealt with in Chapter 6. The chapter on the implications of the study (Chapter 8) will deal with the second method and broader meaning of data interpretation. The results and inferences drawn within the research data are compared with other research results and conclusions.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

A survey of a military group would consider the unique assignment situation. Sometimes, selected respondents are hard to reach particularly if they are assigned in relatively inaccessible areas. This includes situations where the respondents are either conducting operations in remote areas, serving aboard ship, or schooling abroad. In such cases, a longer period of survey as well as replacement of respondents are needed. Also, self-administered questionnaire does not offer adequate control particularly when respondents are left on their own to answer it. This study, therefore, recognizes these limitations in the conduct of the

survey.

2.1 The Armed Forces of the Philippines

The politicization of the Philippine military may be better understood by tracing its roots and development since the pre-Spanish period. It may be observed from Philippine history that Filipino soldiers tend to follow two tendencies: either resistance or subservience to their indigenous or foreign rulers.

2.11 Resistance against

Spanish Conquest

A book on military history of the Philippines, a required reading in History of Military Art at the Philippine Military Academy, starts with the Battle of Mactan and depicts the first Filipino resistance against the Spanish conquest. It narrates how Lapu Lapu, the native chieftain of Mactan Island, led his followers in an organized resistance against the invading Spaniards led by Magellan. Based on the account of Pigafetta, Magellan's chronicler, Baclagon noted Magellan's errors including the lack of preparatory planning particularly gathering information about the island and the capabilities of the inhabitants, the attack of Lapu-Lapu's superior force frontally and the inability to commit the force of Rajah Humabon who was willing and ready to help him. In short, Magellan became overconfident by the superiority of his arms that he underestimated Lapu-Lapu and his men. On the other hand, Lapu-Lapu displayed better judgment, leadership and tactical skill by applying the principle of concentration of combat power through numerical superiority that allowed him to maneuver a double envelopment that finally resulted in the defeat of Magellan, who later was mortally wounded, and his troops.

Despite initial native opposition to the conquest, the Spaniards by their superior weaponry gradually conquered Luzon and Visayas and ruled the islands for more than three centuries.

But the Spanish rule was deeply resented by the natives because of its oppressive policies that include the levying of tribute, imposition of forced labor, abuses and corruption of the Spanish officials, the arrogance and discrimination showed by the Spaniards. These grievances were expressed in major revolts, particularly the revolt of Lakandula and Soliman, chieftains of Manila settlements in 1570-1571 against Miguel Lopez de Legaspi and Martin de Goite; the Tamblot's rebellion in Bohol in 1622; the Leyte revolt of 1622; Caraga revolts (Mindanao) in 1630; the Cagayan insurrection in 1639; the Visayan revolt of 1649-1650; Malong's rebellion in Pangasinan, 1660; Dagohoy's rebellion in Bohol, 1774; revolt of Diego Silang, 1863. The rebellions were characterized with the wide use of guerilla tactics in which superiority in number and arms of the Spaniards were overcome by stealth fighting, ambush and raids.

Reviewing the events of the period, O.D. Corpuz remarked:

Whether the barangays submitted to the Spaniards meekly, or welcomed them in friendship, or resisted with arms and overcome by force, the colonial regime weighed down heavily upon them all....They contained their sense of loss and oppression patiently,initially reposing trust in the Spanish king, but in the end they staked everything toward rebellion and death, because the regime could not give them justice.

2.12 Filipinos in the Armed

Services of Spain

During the Spanish period, the Spaniards enlisted Filipinos in their wars and campaigns against foreign forces or even against Filipinos themselves. Baclagon cited some reasons for this fact to include: their adventurous spirit which make them love military life, prospect of good pay and a respectable status in society, the need to supplement Spain's small number of troops in the island, and the lack of cohesive or nationalistic feelings among Filipinos. Apart from quelling native revolts, Filipinos helped the Spaniards won wars against the Chinese, Dutch, Moros and the British, specifically against the Limahong expedition, the expeditions to the Moluccas in 1580 and 1583, the Chinese revolt of 1603, the war against the Dutch in 1647, expeditions to Mindanao and Jolo, and against the English invasion of the Philippines in 1762.

Baclagon noted, however, that "when the Filipino revolts started to occur and some of these soldiers actually deserted to join the rebel forces, quite a number of prominent Spaniards began to express disgust and fear toward these Filipino units."

2.13 The Philippine Revolution and the

Philippine-American War

While the early revolts showed common feelings of Spanish oppression and injustices among the natives, there was no common effort against redressing them. The revolts "did not take place simultaneously but one after another, depending upon the patience of the people and the presence of a leader in the locality." Lacking unity, therefore, these early revolts resulted in failure.

The spread of liberal ideas in the 19th century, however,

encouraged the rise of Filipino leaders. Along with the increased knowledge of the natives, this caused the growth of national consciousness. Initially disavowing separation from Spain, early Filipino leaders merely sought reforms, such as changing the military form of government to civilian rule, the recall of Spanish friars and secularization of parishes, representation in the Spanish Cortes, and equal treatment of the law before court of justice. Under dominant monastic influence, the Spanish clergy became alarmed with growing nationalism and attempted to suppress it. With the failed insurrection in Cavite Arsenals in 1872, the clergy took it as an opportunity to railroad the execution of Filipino priests who were heading the secularization movement: Burgos, Gomez and Zamora. This further inflamed the nationalist movement, which led to the founding of the Katipunan by Andres Bonifacio. Imbued with the ideals of the French revolution, the Katipunan advocated an armed revolt. Urged to join it, Rizal declined as "the revolution was ill-timed and lacked preparation, because the cultured element and plutocracy did not support it, and that without arms, ships and the support referred to, failure was sure to ensue..." Hearing this, Bonifacio was incensed, "Thunder! whoever did Dr. Rizal read that for a revolution you must first have arms and ships? Where did he hear it?"

Bonifacio finally launched the revolution. Starting in Manila, it spread out to other parts of the country. In Cavite Aguinaldo made remarkable victories against Spanish troops. Compared with the marginal battle achievements of Bonifacio, this caused a leadership struggle in the movement. This was resolved in favor of Aguinaldo who assumed the leadership after Bonifacio was tried and executed for treason.

The revolution created a momentum that forced the Spaniards to seek a truce. This led to the pact at Biaknabato that stipulated the cessation of hostilities and the exile of Aguinaldo to Hongkong.

At this time, there was a strained relationship between the United States and Spain on Cuba. With the start of the Spanish-American war, the Americans sought to secure Filipino cooperation in a joint cause against Spain by promising independence. Thus, Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey met in Hongkong for this purpose.

Upon return from Hongkong in May, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation war against Spain. Establishing a dictatorial government, he organized the Philippine Army on February 2, 1889. All Filipino citizens between 18 to 35 were conscripted and territorial mobilization was directed.

When Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet anchored at Manila Bay on May 7, 1898, he sent a liaison to Aquinaldo and encouraged him to reactivate the revolt to contain the Spaniards in Manila. This was followed later with mock war between the Spaniards and the Americans.

Uprisings spread with spontaneity in almost all parts of the country. Rebel victories followed one after another and soon Aguinaldo was congratulated by Admiral Dewey. Believing that the Americans merely wished to help the Filipinos, as they did the Cubans, to gain freedom, Aguinaldo proclaimed independence on June 12, 1898, reorganized a revolutionary government and formed a cabinet. He also organized the local governments all over the country.

But when Spain was paid by the $20 million indemnity, Aguinaldo realized that the Filipinos would be left out. Also, the actions of American commanders in the capture of Manila showed no intention of turning over the country to the Filipinos. Aguinaldo refused to recognize the transfer of sovereignty. He declared the independence of the Philippines on June 12, 1898 and established Malolos as its capital.

The antagonism between the Filipino and American forces broke out on February 4, 1899. Confronted with superior forces and arms, the Filipinos gradually retreated into mountain strongholds and launched guerilla warfare. The violent repressive measures of the Americans in subduing guerillas were quite ineffective as it aroused more indignation and defiance. The guerilla movement, however, collapsed with the capture of Aguinaldo and his subsequent surrender proclamation. But several of his followers opted to carry on the struggle to include Generals Lukban, Malvar, Noriel, and Sakay. Because of their leadership, hostilities went on in Batangas, Mindoro, Cebu, Bohol and Samar.

The fighting capability of Filipino soldiers drew the admiration of General Lawton with this remark: "Taking into account the disadvantages they have to fight against in arms, equipment and military discipline, they are the bravest men I have ever seen."

2.15 The American Occupation

With the establishment of the civil government and to restore peace and order, the U.S. government opted for a non-military approach by establishing the Philippine Constabulary. This was justified in that "the U.S. Army in the Philippines had neither the will nor the organization to do police work, or take part in the maintenance of order or suppression of crime... its job was to put down armed insurrections that had got beyond the control of civil authorities."

The integrated police system operated in the pacified areas in Luzon and Visayas particularly when military rule was lifted in 1904. Because of peace and order problems, Sulu and Mindanao were governed by special laws.

Filipino constables won the admiration of PC Chief Henry Allen. In a report to Washington, Allen lauded them for being "unquestionably more efficient than the Americans."

In 1934 the U.S. Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Law that provided for a ten-year transition Commonwealth government and the setting of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946.

Put in-charge with the defense of the Philippines, Gen. McArthur planned for a concept of operations based on a defensive-offensive type of warfare with forces concentrated in Luzon.

2.16 The Japanese Occupation and

Liberation Period

At the start of the war, the Japanese managed to gain control of the air that contributed to the success of landing operations. However, the Filipino-American USAFFE forces retreated to Bataan without pressure from both flanks. In Bataan they were able to consolidate and make a formidable defense, which unnecessarily delayed the Japanese campaign timetable.

Just like the Americans at the turn of the century, the Japanese military administration formulated a policy of pacification. To augment their regular troops, the Japanese used indigenous personnel to maintain peace and order by organizing the Bureau of Constabulary on May 4, 1942.

Increasing the size of the Constabulary to 40,000 in November 1943, then President Jose P. Laurel also encouraged the establishment of regular training schools to improve the quality of service. The course usually lasted for three months.

Tasked to fight the guerillas, some members of the PC turned up either as guerillas themselves or cooperating with the guerillas. Particularly during the term of Major General Guillermo Franscisco, who belonged to Class 1908 of PC Officers School, as Director of the Constabulary, vital intelligence information were passed to guerilla units that eventually reached the Allied Headquarters in Australia. The PC was later plagued with desertions particularly at the later part of the war.

2.17 1946-1986 Period

The politicization of the military since World War II has been influenced primarily by factors exogenous to the institution. Specifically, its politicization is founded initially upon "the protracted period of armed challenges to weak

constitutional rule, the fragility of political institutions, and the ineffectivity of political governance ... which required the intervention of the military."

Immediately after the independence, the country was faced with a rebellion coming from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the Hukbalahaps or Huks. As a background the local communists took arms against the Japanese in 1942. The war gave the Huks "the opportunity to institute a system of discipline, to arm them with weapons from the US army, and to test their tactics and tactics in many pitched against the Japanese." In 1946 the Huks numbering 10,000 were concentrated north and south of Manila.

Succeeding the presidency after the death of Roxas, President Quirino adopted a policy of leniency by offering amnesty to all dissidents who willingly surrendered and gave up their arms. The policy failed, however, when the Huks returned to the field after a few months. To strengthen the military its counterinsurgency campaign, the government undertook two major policies: it merged the Philippine Constabulary with the Philippine Army in 1949 and organized the troops into a fully-equipped Battalion Combat Teams. In 1950 Magsaysay became Defense Secretary. Shortly in October, he managed to arrest the Huk Politburo that strongly weakened the rebellion. In addition, Magsaysay organized EDCOR, a socioeconomic program of rehabilitation for Huk surrenderees. The twin policies of armed suppression and peaceful rehabilitation finally broke the backbone of the Huk rebellion.

The AFP also sent its troops abroad. They fought in Korea under a United Nations mandate. They also went to Vietnam in 1966 to 1969 as a civic action contingent building roads, bridges, schools and airstrips.

When President Marcos took over in 1966, the military became more involved in nonmilitary tasks particularly in roadbuilding projects. When Martial Law was declared, the military became more of a partner to the regime as implementor of its policies. This allowed the military to expand its role from mere influence to participation in the political process involving judicial, administrative, and industrial management functions.

In January 1981 martial law was lifted since the threats of communist rebellion and Muslim secessionist movement had decreased substantially. The political and economic situation, however, continued to deteriorate particularly when Senator Aquino was assassinated in August 1983. This led to the formation of the Reform Armed Forces Movement (RAM) composed of young and idealistic officers who launched a campaign against issues such as the "widespread corruption in the military, the lack of professionalism, promotions based on favoritism, and overstaying generals who blocked the younger generations career advancement."

Specifically on August 21, 1985, the RAM formed an 11-man Adhoc Steering Committee with the following as its objectives: to fight graft and corruption in the AFP; to ask for promotions based on performance, merit, seniority and fairness; to work for better medical attention and services; to eliminate the "bata-bata system"; and to improve logistical support for the officers and men fighting insurgency in the field.

President Marcos acceded to the holding of a snap presidential election in which he and Mrs. Corazon Aquino became the candidates. Held on February 7, 1986 the presidential election became highly controversial. Finally on February 22, 1986 Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos proclaimed a military revolt to seek ouster of Marcos and declaration of Aquino as winner in the presidential election. Seeking refuge at Camp Aguinaldo, the reformist forces defied the government forces and drew support from sympathetic military commanders, the political opposition, and the masses. This tipped the balance of power in favor of the rebels. On February 25, Marcos finally left Malacanang with his family and advisers. This paved the way for a transition government with Aquino as the new President.

The RAM Manifesto explains the rationale of the organization in spearheading military intervention of February 1986:

It is our basic aim to establish a unique martial tradition for the nation which envisages that in the event we are compelled to intervene in the political life of the nation to save it, the Members pledge to each other, that they shall not exercise political power, and that they shall return to the barracks when the sovereign will of the people has prevailed.

The military involvement at EDSA was justified by General Jose Almonte as a case of "a man saving another drowning man"; that is, the soldiers saving the nation.

2.18 The Post-1986 Period

From 1986 to the present there had been several attempts of military intervention, which make "the AFP as a potentially decisive political force in our society." These include: the February 1986 coup cum revolution, the July 1986 Manila Hotel incident, the November 1986 "God Save the Queen" plot, the January 1987 GMA 7 incident, the April 1987 "Black Saturday" incident, the July 1987 takeover plot of the Manila International Airport, the August 1987 coup attempt, and the December 1989 coup attempt. Considered the most dangerous threat against the Aquino regime was the "God Save the Queen" plot as it had the characteristic of a chain-of-command takeover. However, Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos did not go along with, resisted and contained the plot.

The causes of these coups, particularly that of the December 1989 coup attempt, were identified. For those involved, the following reasons were advanced: failure of the government to deliver basic services; graft and corruption; too much partisan politics, bureaucratic inefficiency, poor and non-responsive military leadership, lack of genuine reconciliation, uneven treatment of human rights violation committed by the military and the communist armed group, absence of good government, softness on the communist and left-leaning armed groups, and failure of the leadership to address socio-economic problems. Those who fought on the side of the government advanced the same reasons to include: obsession with power which they thought they had won but handed over to Aquino in February 1986, material considerations of coup leaders, personal grievances, strong fraternal or personal ties, naive idealism, and messianic complex.

2.2 The Philippine Military Academy

As a major institution of the AFP, the PMA indicates in its roots and development the same two tendencies of resistance and subservience to native or foreign rulers. The latter is the more dominant trend, however, except in recent years when PMA cadets as well as alumni overtly supported military intervention in politics.

The politicization of the military is not only due to the postwar politicization of the country but also to "the demographic character of recruits to the military's officer corps."

The Philippine Military Academy as an institution will be discussed at length not only because its alumni are the respondents of this study but also of its role in the professional socialization of the core of the AFP officer corps.

2.21 The Spanish Period

During the Spanish period, an Academia General Militar was established with the objective, "to allow sons of military men resident in the colonies to enter the militia and to enable soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the army to become officers." Conducted for three years, the course taught include basic subjects of geography, history, and mathematics as well as practical courses in fortification, topography, and artillery. Selected graduates were further sent to the General Military Academy of Spain in Toledo.

2.22 The Revolutionary Period

With the promulgation of the Philippine Republic, Aguinaldo ordered the formation of a military academy on October 25, 1898 in Malolos, Bulacan. With sessions to start on November 1, the classes were divided into two sections, one for field officers from colonels to majors, and the other from Captains and below. After finishing the course, graduates became regular officers of the army. The course of instruction was divided into two parts. The first part consisted of current orders and regulations, field and garrison regulations, military justice and penal laws. The second part included arithmetic and military accountability, geography and history, field fortifications, and map drawing and reading. Based on the directive, its first director was Manuel Sityar. The Academia Militar was housed in the convent of Barasoain together with the Univesidad de Pilipinas and Institute Burgos. It was cut short by the capture of Aguinaldo in 1901.

2.23 The American Period

With the establishment of the Philippine Constabulary, the PC Officers School was organized on February 17, 1905 at the Sta. Lucia Barracks in Intramuros, Manila. Its formation was made imperative by the breakdown in the effectiveness among Constabulary officers because of enlarged responsibilities and expanded jurisdiction.

The PC Officers' School was later transferred to Baguio City in 1908. Starting with a three-month course, the curriculum was expanded to a six-month course in 1908; then, to a nine-month course in 1916; a two-year course in 1919; and a three-year course in 1928. In the same year, the school was renamed as Philippine Constabulary Academy. Finally, based on the National Defense Act of 1935, a four-year course for a Bachelor of Science degree was introduced in 1935. Simultaneously, the institution was changed to the present Philippine Military Academy. The formation of the PMA was guided by the alumni of the US Military Academy at West Point including then Lieutenant Colonels Eisenhower and Ord who drafted the plans and had Colonel Duckworth-Ford as its first superintendent.

The influence of West Pointers paved the way for the adoption of the West Point system in the PMA's academic curriculum and military practices, as manifested in the engineering-oriented curriculum, the honor code, the fourth class system, and the cadet uniform itself consisting of cadet gray, glittering bell buttons, shako, and streamlined chevrons.

In describing the West Point system, which the other U.S. military academies have also adopted, Lovell points to its emphasis upon the development of the "whole man." This type of education and training has mathematics as the core of intellectual discipline, which is consistent with the classical educational thought such as the one described in Plato's Republic. Lovell further characterizes it as basically the creative synthesis of Sparta and Athens involving a solid academic education (Athenian) as well as military discipline and physical training (Spartan). Specifically, "the Spartan ideals are those of the noble warrior: austerity, discipline, the comradeship of arms, devotion to the state and, above all, a commitment to the heroic deeds and a love of glory. Athenian ideals, in contrast, are especially of culture and learning."

This system of education was introduced by Sylvanus Thayer, superintendent of West Point from 1817 to 1833. Thayer drew this vision of a seminary-academy from the French method of technical education, which combined both the Athenian and Spartan ideals. Specifically, West Point was modeled closely after the educational system of Ecole Polytechnique of Paris which had mainly an engineering education.

A main feature of the West Point system is the fourth class system. It refers to the Plebe or first year period of training which provides the cadet a transition from civilian to military life. A deliberate period of testing, it requires a plebe to "stand on his own feet, to function properly under pressure, respond promptly and intelligently to orders, measure up to the highest standards of character, sense of value and discipline."

The selection of cadets to PMA during this period was quite stiff. In 1940, for example, out of 6000 aspirants who took the entrance examination all over the country, only 120 joined the class of 1940.

The fourth class system was proven effective by the excellent record of PMA Classes 1944 and 1945 during the war. Disbanded at the start of the war when they were on or just finished plebe year, they enlisted in the army or organized guerilla forces throughout the country.

2.24 The Japanese Period

During the Japanese period, a Constabulary Academy in different areas was established to educate and professionalize the ranks of the Constabulary. The first branches of the Academy were organized in Araullo High School in Intramuros and Torres in Tondo, 1 Sept 1942. This was later followed by other branches in Gagalangin barracks in Tondo, Santa Lucia Barracks in Intramuros, as well as in provincial areas in Camp Allen, Baguio and Cebu.

2.25 The 1946 to 1986 Period

The PMA was reactivated and reopened on May 5, 1947. Graduates of West Point continued to have a strong influence on the PMA. Lieutenant Colonel Tirso Fajardo, a graduate of West Point in 1934 and member of the pre-war academics group became its second superintendent. The West Point system, therefore, continued to be adopted to include the academic and physical education curriculum, honor code and the fourth class system. Applicants are selected according to district representation and competitive examination and must fulfill the requirements of being a high school graduate and with an age range from 17 to 22 years old.

A new site for the PMA was constructed at Loakan, Baguio City in 1947. It was appropriately named after Gen. Gregorio del Pilar who died in battle at the age of 24 which is just about the average age of a graduating cadet. With Del Pilar's high sense of nationalism and idealism, the cadets are subtly encouraged to emulate and identify themselves with the hero and particularly with his brief and glorious career. His relevance to the cadets can be summed up by a writer's comment: "Gregorio del Pilar died for the country and for the Commander-in-Chief (Gen. Aguinaldo, his friend). What higher form of loyalty is there?"

Nationalistic fervor continued to be felt at PMA particularly when the use of Pilipino commands was adopted in 1967. This was later adopted by the AFP in the 1970s. The English nomenclature of the cadet companies in which the Cadet Corps was organized was changed on September 1, 1976. With the increase in the number of cadets, the four traditional phonetic company names - Alfa, Bravo, Charlie and Delta - were dissolved and cadets were distributed at random to the newly organized companies named after six decisive battles in Philippine history: Bessang, Tirad, Pinaglabanan, Bud Dajo, Mactan and Imus. However, Filipinization of company designation was shortlived. In May 1977 with the appointment of a West Point graduate as Superintendent, the cadet companies reverted back to old phonetic designations with Echo and Foxtrot added.

The early 1970s was marked by the defection to the New People's Army of 1lt Victor Corpus, an alumnus, while serving as staff at the PMA. The Academy Scribe describes the sentiments of the cadets of his defection: "While the bravery shown by Corpus in advancing his principles and convictions brought him a certain amount of admiration from the Cadet Corps, his actuations against his own Alma Mater somehow united the cadets in denouncing him."

Generally the value system of the AFP and the PMA during this period reflects the ideals of civil control as shown in the following statement:

The fact that retired military men go on politics rather than standing aloof and contemptuous of the democratic political process as they do in some countries means as there is not, at present, a deep division between politicians and military men, for they share roughly the same value system. They do not represent a separate professional military class with its own traditions and way of life, as in pre-war Germany or Japan. The officers and men of the Philippine Armed Forces are drawn from the general population, to which they return, the officers trained at the Philippine Military Academy are brought up in the tradition of the supremacy of civil authority. The problem in the Philippines is not so much one of the military taking over the government by coup d'etat as of keeping the Armed Forces free from gross political interference by Congress and the local authorities..."

This attitude, however, changed markedly in 1986.

2.25 The Post-1986 Period

It was noted earlier that the politicization of the military is primarily a product of the post-war politicization of the country. Military politicization is also the result of endogenous factor particularly the demographic character of recruits to the officer corps. Miranda, in an ongoing study of PMA cadets belonging to Classes 1951 to 1991, reveals some interesting findings about trends in the recruitment of cadets that predispose them toward politicization. Specifically, these trends include: the recruitment of cadets that come from socioeconomically better-off families and with parents who are mostly college graduates; almost 90% of the cadets had attended college before entering the PMA with about two-thirds of them coming from the best Philippine universities and colleges; and about half of the cadets have relatives in the military.

In February 1986 when the EDSA Revolution took place, the cadets sided with the rebels. Again the Academy Scribe gives a vivid description of the event:

Within the walls of the Philippine Military Academy, confusion and tension rose. A national crisis was on the run, giving each cadet a feeling of fear and uncertainty. Uncertainty not only to the Academy and its reputation but uncertainty to their future and their family. And so it came that each member of the Cadet Corps was asked to decide on whom they would side. Finally, the majority decided that they would defend and uphold the Nation's integrity under the rebel's wings, led by General Fidel Ramos and Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. With this the rest of the cadets swiftly followed. While the Revolution was at its peak, the Cadet Corps was armed and ready, waiting for orders to come down.

For this support the Cadet Corps was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation Badge along with other units who actively supported the Revolution.

The subsequent political unrest did not spare the PMA. In March 1987, a few days before the graduation ceremony in which President Aquino was invited as main speaker, the roof of the PMA grandstand was torned down in a bomb explosion in which four died and 43 were injured.

During the August 1987 coup attempt, the Cadet Corps came up openly in support of the rebel cause. A one page resolution called "Expression of Sentiments," the four classes of the Cadet Corps (1988 to 1991) gave their stand on three points: that politicians observe a hands-off policy on purely military affairs; that the persons in authority must exercise justice and good sense in dealing with the rebel soldiers; and that there shall be a dialogue between the government and the rebel representatives with full media coverage.

The cadets also planned to go on strike but this did not push through after the PMA officials conducted dialogues with them to settle their grievances.

The efforts of AFP and PMA officials to isolate the PMA cadets from military intervention seem to bear fruit when no cadets were involved at all in the 1989 coup attempt.

What is the proportion of PMA graduates who were involved in a coup as compared to non-PMA graduates?

In a fact-finding investigation of the 1989 coup attempt, the Davide Commission came out with a report showing that 210 or 9.4% of PMA graduates were involved in the coup attempt as compared to 259 or 2.2% of non-PMA graduates (see table 2.1). The Commission concluded that although "the major players of the December 1989 coup came from the country's military school, the figures bear out the fact that rebel PMA alumni are an aberration, not the norm."

What could be the reasons why some PMA graduates involve themselves in coup attempts? One aspect may be found in the military professional socialization of its officer corps at the Philippine Military Academy. Specifically, the demographic character of PMA cadets indicate politically-inclined individuals based on their generally middle class socioeconomic and superior educational backgrounds. This political awareness and sensitivity are further developed at the PMA where they imbibed high ideals such as love of country, honor and leadership by example. Exposure to military and civilian superiors who lack these ideals is frustrating particularly to new graduates. This is aggravated when motivational interests that the military closely identify with are perceived to be endangered. These motives include: the interests of the nation, the interests of the socioeconomic class the military identify and corporate and individual self-interests.

2.3 Summary

Since the pre-Spanish period, Filipino soldiers tend to follow two tendencies regarding their relationship to either indigenous or foreign rulers.

The first tendency is resistance against perceived injustice and oppression whether under a foreign or native ruler. This is exemplified by succession of disparate revolts against the oppressive Spanish rule, which later led to a national revolution culminating in the founding of the short-lived Philippine Republic of 1898. With the Spaniards almost defeated, the Americans who were initially an ally showed its imperialist ambitions and this led to the Philippine-American war. Even with the superiority of American arms, the Filipinos fought fiercely. When conventional warfare became untenable for the Filipinos, they shifted to guerilla warfare. Even with the capture of Aguinaldo, many of his generals continued the struggle for a number of years. When the Japanese invaded the Philippines in the 1940s, the Filipinos fought bravely under the Americans. After the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, Filipinos continued to fight as guerillas until the country was liberated. After independence armed resistance to the government was launched by the local communists in the 1950s. Suffering setbacks and becoming dormant afterwards, the Communist Party of the Philippines was revitalized in the 1960s by a new set of leaders. Since then, its military arm, the New People Army, has been fighting the government forces. Some Filipino Muslims, who vigorously resisted the Spaniard and the American rule, are demanding secession from the Philippines. Finally, the latest phenomenon of resistance came from the military rebels. After triggering the coup cum revolution of 1986 that brought down the authoritarian rule of Marcos and installed Aquino, the military rebels led a series of coup attempts against the Aquino regime.

The second military tendency, on the other hand, is a history of subservience to a foreign or native rule. The Filipinos became valuable soldiers in the service of colonial Spain, United States and Japan. After independence the military generally follow civilian supremacy except in later years when some military factions led a series of coup attempts against the Aquino regime.

Given these two military tendencies, it may be assumed that under a perceived injustice or oppression, Filipino soldiers tend to rebel. However, under a relatively enlightened leadership, they tend to be loyal followers.

The politicization of the Philippine military since World War II has been influenced by factors both exogenous and endogenous to the institution. Primarily, military politicization is founded on the politicization of the society itself, which is characterized by a general lack of compromise and the use of open violence in the political process common in Third World countries. In the Philippines, this condition resulted in a low state and regime legitimacy manifested in a weak constitutional rule, fragile political institutions, and ineffective political governance. Consequently, armed groups posed a challenge to the regime that required the intervention of the military. The country has been confronted by three major armed groups: the CPP-NPA, the Muslim secessionists and the military rebels itself.

The politicization of the military is also a product of endogenous factor. One aspect may be found in the military professional socialization of its officer corps at the Philippine Military Academy. Specifically, the demographic character of PMA cadets indicate politically-inclined individuals based on their generally middle class socioeconomic and superior educational backgrounds. This observation of high political awareness and sensitivity among PMA cadets and alumni was borne out in the past coup attempts. The PMA cadets openly supported the February 1986 and August 1987 coups, while PMA graduates played dominant roles in the series of coup attempts against the Aquino regimes.

3.1 Profile of Respondents

A representative survey ideally requires that the major elements of the survey population be proportionately represented in the survey sample. With rank and branch of service as principal categories, the sample respondents are proportioned based on the strength of the AFP regular officer corps.

As table 3.1 shows, the profile of 500 respondents reveal the following characteristics:

1. Categorized by rank variable, the sample respondents are proportionally represented by the: general rank (2%), colonel (10%), lieutenant colonel (7%), major (7%), captain (27%), first lieutenant (27%), and second lieutenant (19%). On the other hand, sample respondents by branch of service have these proportions: Philippine Army (40%), Philippine Constabulary (30%), Philippine Air Force (13%), and Philippine Navy (18%). The figures indicate that most of the respondents come from the ranks of captain and first lieutenant (54%). The figures by branch of service show that seven out of ten respondents (70%) come from the ground or land-based forces (the PA and PC). The rest (31%) of the respondents are from the technical or the air- and sea-based forces (the PAF and PN).

2. By age groups, seven out of ten respondents (70%) are between 21 to 35 years old (see table 3.2). By length of military service, almost the same number of respondents (68%) is between one to 15 years of service (table 3.3). This means that three fourths of the regular officer corps are relatively young in age and new in the service.

3. On birthplace by region, more than one-third of the respondents come from the National Capital Region and Region 4, one-sixth (17%) from Region 1, less than one-tenth each from Region 3 (9%) and Region 6 (8%), and the rest come from the other regions (varying between 1% to 6%) (see table 3.4).

4. About one-sixth of the respondents (17%), who are mostly senior officers, have finished their graduate education with those in the Philippine Navy having the highest percentage (23%), followed by those in the Philippine Air Force (18%), Philippine Constabulary (17%), and Philippine Army (15%) (see table 3.5).

5. Regarding the educational attainment of the respondents' parents, more than three-fourths (68%) have gone to college. About half of the fathers (51%) and mothers (47%) have finished either a college or graduate education (table 3.6). The high educational attainment of majority of the respondents' parents indicates a generally middle class background of the respondents.

6. Categorizing the parents' educational attainment by the respondents' ranks shows that company-grade respondents (lieutenants and captains) have majority of the parents (48 to 53%) finishing a college education as compared to the field-grade respondents (39 to 42%) (table 3.7). This may suggest the increasing sophistication of the PMA-trained officers in terms of family socio-economic background.

7. Generally, all respondents have relatives in the military. Almost four out of 10 (38%) have first-degree relatives either as parents, children, brothers or sisters (table 3.8).

The profile of the respondents discussed above generally support an earlier finding by Miranda based on demographic data of 7000 PMA cadets from Classes 1951 to 1959. The findings reveal a trend of cadet recruitment coming from socio-economically better-off families, with majority of the parents having college degrees, and with sizeable number having close relatives in the military.

3.2 Regime Legitimacy

The concept of regime legitimacy is discussed in detail in section 1.62. It is categorized in terms of civil legitimacy or consent of the people and performance legitimacy or the ability of the regime to govern.

3.21 Perceptions of Civil

Legitimacy

Civil legitimacy is the primary basis of legitimacy at the national level. Operationally defined in terms of consent of the

people, it has as indicators the results of elections, referenda and survey opinion.

In this study, the civil legitimacy of the regime will be indicated by the respondents' perceptions of the trustworthiness of the regime's key political institutions and their leadership: the Office of the President, the Congress and the Supreme Court. In addition, the manner in which the respondents voted in the Constitutional plebiscite and in recent elections will be considered.

and personalities

As tables 3.9 and 3.10 show, the trustworthiness of the four key political institutions of government along with their leaders are shown (see also charts 3.1 and 3.2).

The judiciary is most trusted among the three political branches of government. Large majority trust rating (68%) and margin of trust (+58%) are accorded the Supreme Court. Also, the majority of the respondents trust its Chief Justice, Marcelo Fernan (51%).

The high trust rating of the Supreme Court is in contrast with the low trust ratings of the other three government institutions: the Office of the President (36%), the Senate (30%) and the House of Representatives (23%). Overall, these four institutions garner a frequency mean index of 39% (a low trust rating) and a positive low margin of trust of 9%.

The trust ratings of the personalities representing these institutions range from a neutral trust rating for Senate President Jovito Salonga (42%), a little but bordering on neutral trust for President Corazon Aquino (39%) with a barely positive margin of trust (+1), and a very little trust for Speaker Ramon Mitra (19%).

The overall frequency mean rating of these four personalities is 38% (a little trust rating bordering on neutral trust) and a positive single-digit margin of trust of +6%.

As table 3.11 shows, the perceptions of the respondents on the trustworthiness of institutions/personalities in the executive branch of our government are indicated. As compared to the Office of the President, much lower ratings are received by officials in the local government (11%) and barangay (21%).

The lower ratings of institutions and personalities of the civilian government are in contrast with the institutions and personalities associated with the military. As table 3.12 shows, clear trust ratings are received by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (68%) and the Department of National Defense (61%). Although falling under the neutral trust scale, the majority of the respondents give trust ratings to General Renato de Villa (58%) and Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos (50%).

The respondents were asked on whom among the two presidential contenders won in the 1986 election. As table 3.13 shows, the results indicate a clear split opinion: Aquino (29%), Marcos (26%) and neutral or no opinion (32%).

Categorized into branches of service, support for Aquino varied from more than a third (37%) of the PC to less than a fourth (23%) of the PAF respondents. Among the rank groups, the lieutenant colonels are most supportive (42%), while the lieutenants (27% and 25%) are the least supportive.

As regards the 1987 Constitution, two-thirds of the respondents (66%) disagree with the manner it was formulated and adopted (see table 3.14). They prefer that the commissioners should have been elected rather than merely selected and appointed. By branch of service, PA respondents register the most dissension (72%) while the PN respondents give the least disagreement (55%). By rank the generals are most supportive (58%) while the lieutenant colonels and the first lieutenants give only minimal support (14% and 22%).

Because of this disapproval, only a little more than one-third of the respondents (35%) voted "Yes" for its ratification on February 2, 1987. The majority (51%) voted "No." Categorized by branch of service, support for Constitutional ratification ranges from less than half of the respondents from the Philippine Navy (47%) to only about one-fourth from the Philippine Constabulary (26%). Among the rank groups, the colonels (48%) are most supportive of the Constitution, while the lieutenants (29 and 26%) are least supportive. It is worthwhile to note that only one-third of the generals (33%) favor the Constitution while two-thirds (67%) are against ratification (see table 3.15)

This reservation for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution conforms with actual plebiscite results in polling precincts with predominantly military voters (table 3.16). Clustered around military camps, these polling precincts contained these plebiscite results: 27,904 or 42% of the total voters, "Yes"; 38,718 or 58%, "No."

The large negative votes predominated in all these precincts. The results by major branches of service including the General Headquarters were: GHQ and attached units (37% Yes, 63% No); Philippine Navy (42% Yes, 58% No), Philippine Air Force (41% Yes, 59% No); Philippine Constabulary (47% Yes, 53% No); and Philippine Army (42% Yes, 58% No).

The negative military votes cast in these polling precincts were in contrast with the national trend of an overwhelming vote in favor of constitutional ratification. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) declared the following plebiscite results: 16,622,111 or 77.04% in favor of ratification; 4,954,373 or 22.96% against; and 209,730 abstention.

It may be concluded that the respondents view the civil legitimacy of the regime to be low as evident by the generally low trust ratings of the top government institutions and personalities. Also, the negative votes cast by the respondents in the ratification of the 1987 Constitution attest to this fact. The reservation of the military against Constitutional ratification is also confirmed in COMELEC results of polling precincts with predominantly military voters. A primary reason for this reservation is that the respondents disagree strongly with the manner in which the Constitution was formulated and adopted. They would have preferred that the 48 commissioners who drafted the Constitution should have been elected rather than appointed by President Aquino.

3.22 Perceptions of Performance

Legitimacy

One way to achieve legitimacy is through performance or success legitimacy, particularly through "success in war, and the maintenance of prosperity, order, peace." Thus, performance legitimacy may be operationalized in terms of the ability of the civilian government to govern. There will be two indicators of government performance: (a) perceptions of the performance of key government institutions and personalities; and (b) perceptions of government performance in addressing certain national problems and issues.

As tables 3.17 and 3.18 show, the respondents' perceptions of performance satisfaction of the four key political institutions of government and their primary occupants are indicated (see also charts 3.3 and 3.4)

The preeminent trust rating of the judiciary is also duplicated by a satisfactory performance rating of the Supreme Court (+55%).

In contrast, the other three major institutions of the Charts 3.3 and 3.4 government receive very low performance satisfaction ratings as well as negative margin of performance satisfaction ratings.

Satisfaction of the performance of the Office of the President is only perceived by less than one-fifth (19%) of the respondents with a clear majority (57%) unsatisfied. This is analogous to the performance ratings of President Aquino who is a few points higher (23%) but with still a majority (54%) not satisfied with her performance. Overall, based on the margin of satisfaction ratings, President Aquino is perceived to have performed better, as indicated by a positive margin rating (+1%), compared with the Office of the President which has a high negative margin rating

(-38%).

Only more than a third of the respondents are satisfied with Senate President Jovito Salonga (35%), almost an equal number are impartial (36%), and less than three-tenths (28%) are dissatisfied. This gives him a positive margin of satisfaction of 16%. On the other hand, the Senate has much lower satisfaction ratings (23%) and a negative margin of satisfaction of 20%.

Speaker Ramon Mitra has the lowest satisfaction rating (19%) among the four key government officials with a negative margin of satisfaction of 26%. Similarly, the House of Representative obtains lower ratings in terms of performance satisfaction (16%) and negative margin of satisfaction (-27%).

Overall, the performance satisfaction rating of the four major government institutions are low as indicated by a frequency mean of 28% and a negative margin mean of -12%.

Assessing solely the performance of the executive department indicates a very low performance satisfaction. As table 3.19 shows, a much lower satisfaction ratings are received by barangay officials (17%) and local government officials (5%), with negative margins of -25% and -50% respectively.

Comparable to the ratings of trustworthiness, institutions and personalities related with the military receive better performance satisfaction ratings than the civilian government institutions. Above majority performance satisfaction ratings are received by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (54%) and the Department of National Defense (51%) as well as the heads of these institutions: General Renato de Villa (54%) and Secretary Fidel Ramos (50%) (see table 3.20).

on certain issues

The political leadership is further rated in terms of its performance on national problems and issues (see table 3.21).

1. More than seven out of ten respondents feel extreme dissatisfaction on the performance of the administration on issues involving land reform (92%), fighting graft and corruption in government (89%), solving the problem of large foreign debts (84%), fulfillment of promises (77%), the delivery of basic services (77%), responding quickly to the problems of the country (75%), and protecting the natural environment (74%).

2. Also, about two-thirds of the respondents are dissatisfied of the government's action related to: the adverse effects of the oil price increase due to the Gulf conflict (67%), bringing about a more peaceful society (67%), minimizing crime (64%), developing livelihood opportunity for citizens (63%), weakening insurgency movements like those of the CPP-NPA and MNLF (61%), responding to the complaints and needs of government personnel (60%), and acting to what the people want (60%).

3. Further, about a majority of the respondents are dissatisfied with government's response to: the needs and complaints of farmers (59%), the needs and complaints of workers (58%), tax collection (58%), the needs and complaints of Filipino contract workers displaced in the Gulf conflict (58%), providing justice (57%), the needs and complaints of earthquake victims (52%), and providing discipline in the military, especially among those soldiers who participated in the attempts to stabilize the present government (43%).

4. Overall, very few (9%) express satisfaction on the performance of President Aquino herself, with about two-thirds of the respondents (66%) clearly dissatisfied. Even much less (5%) are satisfied and more dissatisfied (73%) when asked about the overall performance of the Aquino administration.

The negative margins of satisfaction on all 24 issues, which range from a low of -33% to a high of -88%, express the extreme disappointment of the respondents of the performance of the administration.

In concluding this section of regime legitimacy, it is apparent that the regime suffers not only from low civil legitimacy but more so with performance legitimacy. The low satisfactory performance ratings of top government institutions and personalities attest to this. Much lower ratings are accorded President Aquino and the national administration vis-a-vis their performance on specific national problems and issues.

Military intervention in politics is defined as "The armed forces' constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities." To intervene the military must have both the disposition and opportunity.

A 'disposition to intervene' involves "a combination of conscious motive and of a will or desire to act." It means the propensity and capacity of the military to intervene in politics. In this study, it has as indicators: motive, mood, and self-division of the military.

4.1 The Motive to Intervene

The motive and the mood look into why the military might or might not wish to intervene. The motive to intervene will be indicated in terms of the respondents' perceptions of national, corporate and individual interests. Specifically, self-perceptions of their role in national security and development will be discussed. The mood to intervene will be indicated primarily in terms of the respondents' grievances vis-a-vis the civilian regime.

4.11 The Perceptions of National

Interest

The military that have been politicized hold a belief that "they have some special and indeed unique identification with the 'national interest.'" This section aims to find out the perceptions of the respondents of their roles to protect the national interest.

The Philippine military performs multi-functional roles in national security. Although its primary function is to provide for external defense, it is also involved in an extensive constabulary and developmental activities. Its constabulary function includes the preservation of internal security against subversion and the maintenance of peace and order. It is similarly involved in developmental tasks particularly in support of civil agencies, such as the employment of military engineer units in insurgency-prone areas.

Its role is made more significant in its participation in the transition from authoritarian rule both as a restorer and preserver of the democratic process.

To find out the self-perceptions of their roles in society, the respondents were asked to rate the importance of ten indicators of national security and development consisting of a mix of political, economic and social indicators (see table and chart 4.1).

1. Rated almost unanimously by all respondents (99%) as the most important indicator is the one related to a secure environment in which the peace and order conditions have improved a lot, particularly in terms of lower crime rates and fewer armed encounters between the military and rebel groups.

2. Equally rated as next important by almost all respondents (98%) are three economic and political indicators: (a) a sustained national economic growth, lower rates of inflation and increasing incomes for most people; (b) less graft and corruption in the government; and (c) better administration of justice through the courts and other government agencies.

3. The next two political and economic indicators are also equally rated by nearly all respondents (97%) which show their concern for (a) greater political stability, more public support for government authorities and a decreasing number of people who join rebellious organizations or groups; and (b) more jobs and better incomes for the employed and much smaller number of unemployed and underemployed.

4. Larger majorities of respondents show interest on the importance of three economic indicators: (a) a decreasing number of poor people (93%); (b) a decreasing income gap between the poor and the wealthy families (90%), and fewer struggle between workers and management of private companies (86%).

5. Only a small majority of the respondents (55%) show concern for a reduction of the size and budget of the military as a result of improved peace and order conditions.

The above findings provide insights into a set of core values of the respondents. Primarily, they regard as high priority those indicators that directly affect their internal security and police roles: improvements in peace and order, lower crime rates, and fewer armed encounters between the military and rebel groups. In

fact, these indicators were rated as most important almost unanimously (99%) by the respondents to a degree of a high norm.

The respondents also show an almost equal concern (ratings from 97 to 98%) towards indicators involving economic growth, political stability and social equity. To the level of high norms, the respondents regard as important the essentials for sustained national economic growth, lower rates of inflation, increasing incomes of people; less graft and corruption; better administration of peace; greater political stability, more public support for government authorities, decreasing number of people joining rebellious groups; and more jobs and less unemployment.

The high and almost equal concerns for both security and developmental indicators simply show a strong linkage between these two measures. As noted by a Third World scholar, development "interacts with and is dependent upon, the level of security enjoyed by the state and provided by its citizens."

This emphasizes the importance of military and police functions in the requisites of national development. Further, this means that political, economic and social progress is only possible under an environment that is secure and stable. Similarly, security and development are simply both sides of the same coin; one cannot exist without the other.

The above findings, therefore, indicate a set of core values of the respondents which puts emphasis on stability and order achieved through a serious concern for both security and

developmental tasks.

4.12 The Military Corporate and Individual

Self-Interests

Preservation of its status and privileges is a primary concern of the military. In fact, "Anxiety to preserve its autonomy provides one of the most widespread and powerful of the motives for intervention." Besides the result of professionalism as a reason behind it, Finer describes the military as:

a special body of persons...functionally specialized: designated, indoctrinated and trained to perform a special task, quite different from that of the rest of the community. The more specialized they are the more anxious to take the steps that will safeguard and guarantee their success.

This section attempts to find out the military corporate and individual self-interests through the respondents' self-perceptions of their values, needs and expectations.

self-esteem

As table 4.2 shows, the respondents are confident of their capabilities in performing not only of their primary security roles but also of other functions that may be assigned to them.

1. They strongly disagree (64%) with the statement that the present military does not yet have enough capability to neutralize the armed communist or Muslim rebels.

2. Although close to a majority (44%) acknowledge that Filipinos have enough regard for and appreciate the military.

3. A few (26%) believe that military abuses are many and widespread which drive many people to join the Communist and Muslim rebels.

4. A majority (53%) believe that senior military officials have relatively the same capabilities as civilians in running civilian offices.

5. Similarly, a large plurality (42%) favor that more men with military experience run for public office.

The respondents wish a stronger and more decisive civil and military leadership that would greatly enhance their morale.

1. Although close to a majority (44%) acknowledge that Filipinos have enough regard for and appreciate the military, a plurality (35%) is skeptical. The latter may have been due to their view about the state of military morale and leadership as indicated in the following responses (see table 4.3).

a. For example, a relatively large majority (79%) agree that there is quite a bit of demoralization in the Philippine military.

b. Also, only a few (23%) concur that the current leadership has restored the military professional standards for promotions, assignments and career advancement.

c. Further, almost the same number (24%) believe that the military now has a firm and decisive leadership provided by military officials; and

d. Finally, even less (8%) agree about the effectiveness of leadership provided by civilian officials.

2. Despite the adverse view of the military leadership collectively, the respondents have relatively high regard for individual defense and military officials as well as the institutions they represent (see tables 3.12 and 3.20):

a. Above and close to majority ratings in both trustworthiness and performance are indicated for top defense and military officials: Sec. Fidel Ramos (50/50%) and Gen. Renato de Villa (58/54%).

b. A sizeable majority regard their own institutions as trustworthy: Armed Forces of the Philippines (68%) and Department of National Defense (61%).

c. Based on performance, these institutions still receive majority ratings although slightly below that of the Supreme Court (55%): Armed Forces of the Philippines (54%) and Department of National Defense (51%).

professionalism

The view that the military is jealous to preserve its autonomy is attested by an almost unified view (94%) that politics and the military do not mix well (see table 4.4). The respondents believe that politicians should be restricted from exerting influence beyond what Constitutional and legal provisions explicitly permit. This is reinforced by a large majority opinion (78%) that disciplining the military must be left solely to the officials of the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The inclination of the respondents toward military professionalism may be evident in the following responses:

1. As an indicator of military professionalism, almost half (49%) do not agree with the idea that military men in the active service be appointed or assigned civilian functions.

2. Almost three-fourths (72%) believe that military men should be given more field assignments instead of being assigned office jobs in Manila.

3. A split opinion (agree: 36% vs. disagree: 37%) prevails on the question that it is not good for military men to spend so much time in non-military activities that do not increase their combat skills.

The respondents believe in the involvement of the military in civic action and other socio-economic programs to gain the support of the people (85%). But a majority (56%) disagree that the military budget be reduced in order to support these socio-economic programs.

4.2 Mood: Grievances

Although motive is a necessary condition, the mood provides a sufficient condition for intervention. The mood catalyzes the motives into emotions impelling the military to act. An important cause is "the frustration of its desires - some stinging rebuff to its pride or the indifference or derision of society - may provoke the familiar reactions of anger, the shifting of the blame to civilian and, finally, the desire to vindicate itself by imposing its will upon them."

A primary factor, therefore, which induce the mood to intervene are grievances or grudges based on differences of opinion on some political issues. This section discusses the grievances that the respondents have on the regime.

The respondents were asked on their perceptions of the justification of major grievances against the political leadership (see table 4.6).

1. The strong anti-corruption ideology of the respondents is evident in their ratings of the top three grievances that are all related to corruption: graft and corruption in government (86%), corrupt politicians (85%), and graft and corruption in the military (76%).

2. About two-thirds to three fourths of the respondents feel as justified their grievances on a mix of political, economic, and military issues: weak and indecisive civilian government leadership (75%), inadequate services to soldiers' family (68%), breakdown of basic services (67%), influence peddling by Presidential relatives (66%), civilian intervention in military affairs (66%) and low salary (64%).

3. Strong majorities to strong pluralities of the respondents believe as justified their grievances on: inadequate military supplies and equipment (58%), rapid increase in the cost of living (55%), lack of trust by government officials on the military (54%), presence of communists in government (52%), favoritism in military promotions (51%), too strict human rights policy against the military (49%), weak and indecisive military leadership (44%), government favoring communists (37%), and excessive U.S. influence (35%).

4. The positive margin of justification (justified minus not justified), which range from a high of 80% to a low of 7%, apparently indicate a solid basis for these grievances.

4.3 Self-Division

The military are composed of various branches of service and ranks. To describe, therefore, "the military" as a single monolithic unit may not be appropriate and distinction must be made in certain cases. Particularly, self-division is an important indicator to determine the military disposition to intervene. It is usually assumed that the more united and centralized the military, the greater its capacity to intervene. Events, however, show that "the more inchoate the military establishment, the greater the number of coups, as one element or faction after another seeks to counter or to emulate the success of those of the military establishment who have seized power." The various coups of self-divided armies in Syria, Iraq, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina illustrate this fact.

This section attempts to find out the nature of self-division among PMA officers. This will be done by the statistically finding out the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the respondents as they responded to all the questions posed in the survey.

How homogeneous or heterogeneous are the overall survey responses? To answer this question, the respondents were grouped by branch of service, rank and ethnicity. The chi-square test of homogeneity at.05 level of significance was then used to determine the homogeneity or heterogeneity of a group's perception on each issue item.

4.31 Evidence of

Homogeneity

category groups

As table 4.7 shows, homogeneity tests of all major category groups suggest a homogeneity of perceptions. Out of a total of 564 test items for the three major groups, 445 or 79% of these items show homogeneity. This indicates that the respondents as a generally cohesive group having common perceptions on the many aspects of civil-military relations. Cohesion among PMA graduates is quite strong. Besides their four-year military professional socialization experience as cadets, PMA graduates strengthen their bond through personal and professional activities ranging from attendance to periodic class and alumni meetings to common exposure to danger in field assignments.

The test for each major category group, based on the 188 question items, show the same trend of homogeneity of perceptions. Among the major category groups, the ethnicity group is most homogeneous (with 173 or 92% of the question items indicating homogeneity), followed by the branch of service (154 items or 82%) and, lastly, by the rank variable (118 or 63%) (see tables 4.7 and 4.8).

Analysis is extended to the homogeneity of each branch of service by crosstabulating the question items with all the ranks in a specific branch of service. All the branches of service may be considered as generally cohesive considering that the respondents of each branch of service are homogeneous in their responses to more than 70% of the question items (see table 4.9).

In this regard, the Philippine Air Force ranks first with 170 or 90 % of the 188 total question items indicating homogeneity. This is followed by the Philippine Navy (168 items or 89%), the Philippine Army (148 items or 78%) and, lastly, the Philippine Constabulary (193 items or 72%).

The relative homogeneity of the PMA graduates in the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy may be explained by their small number (forming only 13% and 18%, respectively, of the active-duty PMA graduates in all services) as compared to the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary (which make up 40% and 30%, respectively). Also the officers of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy, being technically air- and sea-based, are relatively isolated from external political demands in which the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary are exposed to as the primary units in counterinsurgency and peace and order operations.

4.22 Evidence of

Heterogeneity

It may be relevant to analyze test items that seem to deviate from the homogeneous trend. This is usually found in question items that show significant differences at .05 statistical level of significance.

Consolidating the question items of the three major category variables, only one question item group shows heterogeneity and this is test group item G (see table 4.10).

The heterogeneity of this particular question item group is further confirmed in the homogeneity test of the rank variable. As table 4.6 shows, all 18 specific question items show heterogeneity of extremely sensitive issues. This question item group asks the respondents of the major grievances of military personnel against the Aquino administration that have motivated them to be involved in several coup attempts. It further asks if these grievances against the Aquino administration are "still justifiable" or "no longer justifiable". Still justifiable is defined in the questionnaire to mean that "the complaint has remained ineffectively addressed or responded to and the situation generating the complaint has remained largely unchanged or has even worsened." On the other hand, no longer justifiable is explained to mean that "the complaint has been effectively addressed and the situation generating the complaint has significantly improved."

In this section, the chi-square test shows all question items having significant differences below the .05 statistical level of significance, which means a clear heterogeneity of perceptions.

1. It is significant to note that the senior ranks tend to believe that the major grievances against the Aquino administration are no longer justifiable. Their responses signify clear support and trust for the administration.

a. As the most senior rank benefiting the most from the administration, the general rank show a perception to with agreement responses of generally about or less than 20%.

b. To a level of intense norms, generals believe that there are no or negligible basis of grievances against the administration particularly in issues, such as: lack of trust by government officials on the military, presence of communist in government, and government favoring communists (0%); and weak and indecisive civilian leadership as well as military leadership, civilian intervention in military affairs, and too strict human rights policy against the military (all at 8%).

2. On the other hand, the junior ranks of first and second lieutenants strongly believe that the major grievances against the administration are still justifiable. Specifically, these grievances include: graft and corruption (83-96%), the civilian leadership (84%), support for the military (64-85%), breakdown of basic services (70-74%), civilian intervention (72-83%), and presence of communists in government (60-70%).

3. It is also to be noted that the ranks of colonel to captain also show strong grievances in issues like graft and corruption, civilian leadership, and support for the military.

Further, severe disparity of perceptions among the seven officer rank groups is found in the statement about whether these "major grievances are enough basis for a coup against the Aquino administration" (see table 4.12)

1. Three out of ten of the first lieutenants agree with the statement (30%) which is followed closely by the second lieutenant (27%);

2. Also, about two out of ten of the captains and lieutenant colonels (19%) agree;

3. Further, about one out of ten of the colonels and majors (10 and 11%) agree;

4. However, none of the generals agree with the statement.

A closer analysis of this major question item is shown in chart 4.2. The respondents are categorized by rank and service based on their responses to this question. Almost a third of the young officers, most particularly the lieutenants (17 to 56%), feel that the above-cited grievances are basis for military intervention.

Among these officers, the lieutenants from the Philippine Air Force (1st Lt: 33%, 2nd Lt: 56%) and the Philippine Army (1st Lt: 35%, 2nd Lt: 27%) are most dissatisfied. Mostly pilots and platoon leaders in the field, these young officers are bearing the brunt of the counterinsurgency campaign. Therefore, they are most exposed not only to personal danger but also to the serious problem of poverty in the rural areas.

The senior officers from all the services are generally supportive of the administration. Among the colonels and lieutenant colonels, the PAF officers are most disgruntled with about a fourth of them (22 and 25%) feeling aggrieved against the administration. The probable reason could be the relatively fewer positions commensurate to their ranks in the PAF as compared to the

other services. The PAF is the smallest among the services in terms of personnel strength. With the availability of major positions being computed based on the number of personnel, the PAF senior officers find themselves being left behind in terms of promotions as compared to their contemporaries particularly in the Philippine Army and the Philippine National Police.

The responses particularly to this significant question item are highly illustrative of the prevailing sentiments of the major groups of officers in the AFP as regards the disposition to intervene.

To sum up, two factors support such inclination. The first factor is a strong motive and heightened mood of the military to protect their interests - national, corporate and individual - especially when the legitimacy of the regime is low. The other factor is an evidence of self-division in the military as shown by gaps in perceptions, particularly between the senior and junior ranks.

The military may have the disposition (the motive and mood) and capacity to intervene but this is not enough to push the military to actual intervention. Another factor is necessary: the opportunity to intervene which is primarily dictated by conditions in the society. Finer describes this factor:

The opportunity to intervene will be indicated by the perceptions of the respondents on the probable occasion for military intervention. Also, the prevailing economic, social, and political conditions during the period of study will also be considered.

5.1 Potential Crises Due to Threats

to National Security

A primary concern of the military is a secure environment. Situations that tend to precipitate overt and latent domestic crisis, particularly in the nature of armed threats to the state, may provide the military an opportunity to intervene.

In this regard, the respondents' perceptions of threats to national security and stability are presented in table and chart 5.1. Asked about the sources and magnitude of such threats, the respondents have the following replies:

1. Among eight probable sources of threats to national security, two are identified by very large majorities of the respondents as posing major threats: (a) the communist rebels (94%) and (b) corrupt politicians (85%).

2. Three groups are identified as next sources of threats by about six of ten respondents: (a) the military rebels (62%); the Muslim rebels (59%); and (c) a foreign country or countries that would like to control the Philippines for various reasons (59%).

3. Only a few of the respondents believe that there is a major threat coming from (a) Marcos "Loyalists" (19%); (b) Catholic Church (18%); (c) and Iglesia ni Kristo (12%).

The above findings suggest a strong set of core values of the respondents. To the level of norm, they manifest a strong concern against communist insurgency (94%) and graft and corruption in government (95%). The military rebels, although considered as a major threat, are perceived as a less serious threat than the communist rebels and those involved in graft and corruption. They are rated almost equal only in the magnitude of threat posed by Muslim rebels and the threat from foreign countries.

5.11 Perceptions of Communist

Insurgency

To confirm the above responses on the seriousness of the threat of communist insurgency, the respondents were asked specific questions related to it. The results, shown in table 5.2, indicate the following:

1. The respondents (86%) affirm that the biggest threat to national security comes from local insurgency and not from any external aggressive power or nation. The problem of graft and corruption is further given emphasis as a major cause of insurgency particularly at the local levels. Specifically, a very large majority of the respondents (85%) believe that support for the

insurgents is enhanced or reinforced by the incompetence and corruption of many local government officials.

2. A very high proportion of respondents (86%) maintain that the fight against insurgency must be a collaborative effort between the civilian government and the military. The respondents believe that the civilian agencies should, in fact, take the lead with the military being used only as a last resort. The prevailing view among military men, particularly those in the field, is that the military seems to be taking the main burden of the insurgency campaign. On the other hand, the civilian government agencies give only a minimal, if not reluctant, support. The sentiment of government's indifference to the counterinsurgency campaign is reinforced by the perception of a plurality (40%) of the respondents of the presence of high government officials who are leftists or communist sympathizers.

3. Consequently, given current conditions, a majority (53%) of the respondents attest to the need for expanding the military and giving it more equipment and funds. Almost the same proportion of respondents (56%) disagree with the reduction of the military budget that more funds might be allocated to the socio-economic programs of civilian government agencies.

5.12 Perceptions of the

Military Rebels

Although considered as less serious than communist insurgency and graft and corruption, the threat from military rebels is considered as the third most serious threat.

An apparent sympathy for the cause of the military rebels may be evident. In the past coup attempts, the military rebels appear to have been encouraged by their perception of the fragile legitimacy of the regime because of popular disenchantment. This view, which was discussed in previous sections of this paper, is also shared by the respondents.

Also, as table 5.3 shows, this sympathy appears to be shown in the following responses:

1. As for the December 1989 coup attempt, about half (48%) of the respondents believe that the military rebels could most probably have succeeded in the December 1989 coup attempt if the United States did not help the Aquino government.

2. As a result of the U.S. involvement, a big majority (87%) believe that no matter what happens, foreign governments should not involve themselves in the internal conflicts among Filipinos.

3. A big plurality (46%) believe that the main reason for the failure of the December 1989 coup attempt was the rebels' lack of popular support, although almost a third (32%) disagree.

5.2 Perceptions of Civil

Support

Despite disenchantment with government performance and sympathy for the military rebels, the lack of opportunity to intervene is manifested by an apparent military support for civil control (see table 5.4):

1. More than seven out of ten respondents (73%) believe that their most important contribution to national security is the protection of the government against those who want to overthrow it.

2. A clear two-thirds (66%) of the respondents believe that even if the head of government is unable to perform his duties properly, any group in the military does not have a reason to try unseating him especially if this means using armed force.

3. The respondents even doubt the contention that to prevent the communists from overthrowing our government, the military itself may temporarily take over as suggested by their split opinions: 24% agree, 23% undecided, and 21% disagree.

4. More respondents favor the view (42% agree vs. 22% disagree with 34% undecided) that military men who participate in acts destabilizing the civilian government must be severely punished.

5. Despite their apparent disenchantment toward government performance and their sympathy toward the grievances of the military rebels against the Aquino administration, a majority (53%) of the respondents believe that these issues are not to be considered as enough grounds for undertaking a coup. On the other hand, barely two out of 10 respondents (22%) favor a coup, while about the same number (19%) are non-committal (see 4.12).

5.3 The Prevailing Conditions

The above perceptions of the respondents on the lack of opportunity to intervene are apparently confirmed by improvements in objective military, political and economic conditions.

5.31 Political/Military Factors

In a 20-year period from 1976 to 1986, the military budget had been decreasing in terms of percentage to GNP (5.2% in 1976 to 1.9 in 1986). However, this trend was reversed in 1987. In nominal terms, military appropriations had increased from 11.6 to 24.5 billion pesos in 1990 and from 1.9 to 2.3% of GNP. It may be noted that heavy increases were registered for 1988 (P18.7B), 1989 (P20.3B) and 1990 (24.5B) (see table 5.5).

With military pay, substantial decreases were registered as compared to previous salary scales. In real terms, military pay in 1986 was equivalent to only about one third that of 1948 (see table 5.6).

In December 1988, however, substantial salary increases were received by military personnel. From January 1986 to December 1987, base pay increases averaged 139%. The basic pay of officers ranged from a high 106% for the rank of lieutenant colonel (P2,669 to P5,000) to a low of 62% for lieutenant general (P5,556 to P9,000). The percentage increases among enlisted men were higher than the officers. It averaged 193%, ranging from a high 237% for the rank of master sergeant to a low of 149% for private first class (see table 5.7).

As a result of the increase in military budget and pay, many officers believe that the complaint about salary had been addressed to particularly after the 1987 coup attempt.

Since its founding in 1969 up to 1987, the CPP/NPA had steadily increased in number and strength: from 250 regulars and 300 firearms in 1969 to a peak of 25,200 regulars and 15,500 firearms in 1987 (table 5.7). In 1988, however, this trend started to reverse itself. Particularly in 1990, during the survey of this study, CPP/NPA regulars were reduced to 17,270 while the number of firearms decreased to 11,200.

In fact, General Lisandro Abadia, the AFP Chief of Staff, is reported to be confident of strategic victory by the end of 1993. A situation when communist insurgency ceases to be a threat, strategic victory, in quantifiable terms, means "a reduction of NPA strength to about 6,920, firearms at 7,730, affected barangay to 539 and guerilla fronts at 43." It is planned that when such victory is declared, the Philippine National Police will assume the lead role in internal security operations, while the AFP will concentrate on external defense.

The above factors show that the objective military conditions of military budget increases and declining insurgent threats do not provide a good opportunity for military intervention. Also, when this survey was conducted, political conditions were not suited for such intervention. Presidential election for 1992 was barely a year away and a peaceful change of administration was expected. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe added to the perception of a declining local communist threat. The U.S. inclination to support the regime against coup threats, as what happened to the December 1989 coup, further negated the occasion for military intervention.

5.32 Economic Factors

Similarly, actual economic factors apparently support the opportunity for military non-intervention. This is suggested by an analysis of some economic variables.

As table 5.8 shows, macroeconomic variables register an economic decline in 1984 and 1985: a decrease in real Gross National Product (GNP) from 91.6 to 87.9 billion pesos, negative growth rates of -5.5 and -4.12, and high inflation rates of 50 and 23%. A turnaround, however, was registered from 1986 to 1989: a real GNP from 89.5 to 106.8 billion pesos, a steady growth rate from 1.86 to 5.67%, and a decreasing inflation rate ranging from .80 to 10.6.

Perceptions of business confidence

A confidence survey for the East Asia region was conducted by Asian Business from 1989 to 1983. An index or numerical rating for each country was arrived at using six survey criteria: local market, export market, turnover, profits, company prospects and economy. As table 5.9 shows, the Philippines in 1989 scored the highest (90) along with Malaysia. During the survey for this study in late 1990, the Philippines still scored a respectable score of 81. These economic indicators seem to show that the Philippines was not then ready for military intervention.

It may be concluded in this chapter that in contrast with the high disposition and capacity to intervene, the respondents perceive a low opportunity to intervene. This is indicated by both endogenous and exogenous factors.

The endogenous factor is the respondents' perceptions that the domestic crisis is manageable, because of diminishing armed threats from the communist insurgents, the military rebels and the Muslim secessionists. As a result a perceptible support for civil control is evident, despite the low regime legitimacy. In this regard, the respondents have a strong commitment to protect the government against those who want to overthrow it; that is, even to the point where the head of government is unable to perform his duties properly.

The exogenous factor on the lack of opportunity to intervene is attested by some improvements in military, political, and economic conditions.

In section 1.7, this study posits that low regime legitimacy (the independent variable) provides the military the disposition and opportunity (the intervening variables) to intervene. This may or may not result in military intervention (the dependent variable). The operationalization of these variables is presented in the previous three chapters.

It is the aim of this chapter to show the relationship of these variables through some statistical measures and tests. With the results of these measures and tests, the strength and direction of the association of the following variables may be shown: (a) between the two indicators of regime legitimacy itself - civil and performance legitimacy; (b) between civil and performance legitimacy, on one hand, and the disposition to intervene, on the other; (c) between civil and performance legitimacy and the opportunity to intervene; and (d) between disposition and opportunity to intervene. From these statistical results, the probability of military intervention or non-intervention may be determined.

Table 6.1 shows the strength and direction of the relationships of these variables. These are based on two statistical measures of relationships: chi-square and gamma. A nominal statistic, chi-square is used initially to find out whether one variable is related to another. For this study, a chi-square significance level of less or equal (< or =) to .05 is used. It may be noted that all the relationships of the variables presented are significant at less than .05. This is followed by using gamma to determine the strength and direction (positive or negative) of the relationship of these variables. A measure of association between two ordinal variables, gamma can range from -1 (perfect negative association) through 0 (no association) to +1 (perfect positive association).

Although there is no set standard for interpreting gamma, an arbitrary set is suggested and used in this study.

6.1 Civil and Performance

Legitimacy

The relationship of civil and performance legitimacy is tested through one indicator of the former and two indicators of the latter. The test item on the trustworthiness of President Aquino is selected as the primary indicator for civil legitimacy. This is crosstabulated with the two indicators of performance legitimacy: (a) the performance of President Aquino, and (b) the performance of the national administration. As table 6.1 shows, the gamma statistic for (a) of +.82 shows a very strong positive association. On the other hand, the gamma statistic for (b) shows a very substantial positive association. Also the gamma t-values of 28.87 for (a) and 11.78 for (b) confirm the statistical significance for both relationships.

The results from these indicators mean that civil and performance legitimacy are closely and positively correlated. As table 6.7 also shows, the crosstabulation of President Aquino's trust ratings and the national administration performance ratings has a downward left to right direction indicating a positive association. In other words, there are more respondents that have little trust with President Aquino and, also, dissatisfied with the performance of the national administration.

The statistical measures and tests for civil and performance legitimacy confirm the low legitimacy of the Aquino regime. The

question may again be posed: Does low regime legitimacy encourage the military to intervene? This question will be the subject of the succeeding sections.

6.2 Regime Legitimacy and Disposition

to Intervene

Civil and performance legitimacy variables are crosstabulated with three indicators of the disposition to intervene. For civil legitimacy indicator, the same test item of President Aquino's trustworthiness is used.

6.21 Civil Legitimacy and Disposition

to Intervene

The indicator of President Aquino's trustworthiness is crosstabulated with three indicators of the disposition to intervene: the grievance in graft and corruption in government (1); the weak and indecisive civilian leadership (2); and the weak and indecisive military leadership (3).

The gamma statistics of the three relationships are presented in table 6.2: (a) plus .53 signifying a substantial positive association for (1); (b) plus .43, a moderate positive association for (2); and minus .31, a moderate negative association for (3).

The result for (3) shows that there is an inverse correlation for the two indicators, which supports previous findings of support for the military leadership. On the other hand, the results for (1) and (2) simply mean that the relatively low trust for President Aquino is directly correlated with the grievances of graft and corruption and weak and indecisive civilian leadership. The relationships also imply the close correlation between civil legitimacy and disposition to intervene variables.

Table 6.8 confirms this relationship; that is, a left to right and relatively downward direction that show a positive association. In other words, there are more respondents who have little trust with President Aquino and, also, feel that the grievance of graft and corruption against the regime is justified. It may also be noted that even those who have much trust with President Aquino also feel that this grievance is justified. This may be interpreted that, because of this grievance, there is a strong disposition to intervene among the respondents despite their trust for President Aquino.

6.22 Performance Legitimacy and Disposition

to Intervene

The relationship of these two variables are tested by means of the crosstabulation of four indicators: performance of national administration vs. graft and corruption (1); President Aquino's performance vs. grievance on graft and corruption (2); Aquino's performance vs. weak and indecisive civilian government (3); and (4) Aquino's performance vs. weak and indecisive leadership (4).

As in the previous section, the gamma statistics for this relationship show similar trends of moderate association for all four indicators: a plus .53 for (1); a plus .44 for (2); a plus .52 for (3) and a minus .32 for (4). Except for (4), which indicate support for the military, the other three indicators show a directly moderate positive relationship for these indicators as well as for the variables of performance legitimacy and disposition to intervene.

Also, table 6.9 confirms this relationship: a clearly downward left to right direction that shows a positive association. This means that there are more respondents who are dissatisfied with the national administration's performance. The same respondents also feel that the grievance of graft and corruption is justified, which indicate a disposition to intervene. In summing up this section on low legitimacy and disposition to intervene, the statistical measures and tests seem to confirm the view that the low civil and performance legitimacy of the Aquino regime gives the respondents the disposition to intervene.

6.3 Low Legitimacy and Opportunity

to Intervene

The statistical measures and tests between low regime legitimacy and opportunity to intervene show some contrasts with the above results. The primary indicator for opportunity to intervene is the test item: "Are these complaints (consisting of a list 18 grievance items against the Aquino administration) enough reason for undertaking a coup?" This question is crosstabulated with the test items on President Aquino's trustworthiness for civil legitimacy and President Aquino's performance for performance legitimacy.

6.31 Civil Legitimacy and Opportunity

to Intervene

Statistical measures and tests on President Aquino's trustworthiness crosstabulated with complaints as enough reason for a coup have these results: a gamma statistic of -.32, and gamma t-value of -5.63 (see tables 6.5 and 6.9) The results mean a significantly moderate but negative association between civil legitimacy and opportunity to intervene.

As table 6.5 also shows, an upward left to right direction of the crosstabulated variables implies a negative relationship. Although the complaints against the regime are justified, the respondents strongly believe that these are not enough reason to engage in a coup. This belief is strong particularly for those who have much trust for President Aquino.

The test item on the performance of President Aquino is also tabulated with the major threat groups with generally negligible association as shown by these gamma statistics: (a) plus .04, communist rebels; (b) plus .01, Muslim rebels; (c) minus .14, corrupt politicians; and minus .07, foreign countries which would like to control the country. These figures support the view that the major threat groups do not give the opportunity for military intervention.

6.32 Performance Legitimacy and Opportunity

to Intervene

Similar results are indicated for the crosstabulation of the President Aquino's performance with complaints as enough reason for a coup: a gamma statistic of -.39. Again, this may be interpreted as a significantly moderate negative association for these indicators and, ultimately, for the variables of performance legitimacy and opportunity to intervene.

As table 6.10 also shows, the results are confirmed in that even those who are dissatisfied with the national administration do not believe that the complaints are enough reason for a coup.

The performance of President Aquino is also tabulated with the major threat groups with generally negligible association as shown by these gamma statistics: (a) plus .04, communist rebels; (b) minus .02, Muslim rebels; (c) minus .23, corrupt politicians; and minus .09, foreign countries which would like to control the country. These figures again confirm the view that the opportunity for military intervention is not timely.

In concluding this section, the statistical measures and tests confirm the view that, even if civil and performance legitimacy of the Aquino regime are low, the respondents believe that the conditions do not provide an opportunity for military intervention.

6.4 Disposition and Opportunity

to Intervene

The above findings of negative relationship of low regime legitimacy and opportunity to intervene are also duplicated when the indicators of the disposition and opportunity to intervene are crosstabulated.

Using the same indicators of grievance on graft and corruption (disposition to intervene) and complaints as justification for coup (opportunity to intervene), the result show a gamma of -7.01, a very strong relationship (see tables 6.1 and 6.11). Also, a consistently negative association is prevalent for this indicator when crosstabulated with threat groups: (a) communist rebel, minus .20; Muslim rebel, minus .24; corrupt politicians, minus .43; and foreign country, minus .10.

Again, these measures and tests confirm the view that the inverse correlation of the variables of disposition and opportunity to intervene. Therefore, this is supportive of the argument that the military could have the disposition but would not have the opportunity for military intervention.

6.5 Summary

In summing up this chapter, Finer suggests four possible situations for military intervention: (1) neither disposition nor opportunity to intervene - no intervention will occur; (2) both disposition and opportunity to intervene - intervention will occur;

(3) no disposition to intervene but the opportunity for doing so is present - the military may intervene but will hold political power on a temporary basis; and (4) disposition, but no opportunity - intervention usually leads to abortive coups.

The findings indicate that the legitimacy of the Aquino regime is low both in civil and performance legitimacy. Although the respondents are inclined to have the disposition, they also believe that this does not give them the opportunity to intervene. Having the disposition, but without the opportunity to intervene could lead to abortive coups as attested by the past coup attempts.

It maybe concluded that although regime legitimacy is low and the disposition to intervene is high, the low opportunity to intervene makes successful actual intervention unlikely. Thus, even if actual intervention is attempted, this could most probably result in failure.

7.1 Survey Results vis-a-vis Other

Military and Civilian

Surveys

To further ascertain this apparent military disenchantment with the civil government, the current survey (to be referred to as the third or post-December 1989 survey having been conducted from October 1990 to January 1991) is compared with the past two surveys of the military. These two surveys are those of the : (a) Miranda and Ciron, "Development and the Military in the Philippines" conducted in April-May 1987 (referred to in this study as the first or the pre-August 87 survey); and Ciron, "The Military Current Perceptions of National Problems and Issues" conducted in April-May 1988 (referred to as the second or pre-December 89 survey).

7.11 Regime Legitimacy and Disposition

to Intervene

A growing disenchantment of the respondents with the government is evident in the comparison of the results of the three surveys (see table 7.1).

1. An increase in the percentages of respondents having the perception that the incompetence and corruption of local government officials as the cause of insurgency growth during the period of pre-August 87 and post-December 89 surveys.

2. A drastic change from the previous survey is a declining perception of respondents that the "military now has a firm and decisive leadership provided for by civilian government officials." This is a drastic decline from 41% agreement response in the pre-December 89 survey to merely 8% agreement in the post-December 89 survey.

3. A slightly perceptible growing sympathy and compassion for the military rebels is evident in the statement that, "Military men who participate in acts destabilizing the civilian government must be severely punished." An agreement of 50% of the pre-August 87 respondents, down to 47% in the pre-December 89 survey, and further down to 42% in the post December 89 survey.

4. The perception that many high government officials do not think highly of the military and distrust their loyalty to the present government did not change from the pre-August 87 to post-December 89 surveys. Both surveys register respondents' agreement of 72%. Despite this view, a major decline in perception is registered on the issue that many high government officials are leftists or communist sympathizers. From 50% agreement response in the pre-August 87 survey, it went down to 28% in the post-December 89 survey.

Trustworthiness of

Institutions

Growing decline of trustworthiness of almost all institutions appears to characterize the perceptions of military respondents (see table 7.2).

1. Although previously rated high in trustworthiness, defense and military institutions showed decline in the esteem of the respondents. The Armed Forces of the Philippines that used to register a rating of 92% in the pre-August 87 survey went down to 84% in the pre-December 89 survey and further down to 68% in the post-December 89 survey. Similarly, the Department of National Defense posted a decline from 70% in the pre-December survey to 61% in the post-December survey.

2. Except the Supreme Court that registered a generally even majority ratings in the three surveys, other civilian government institutions suffer a clear deterioration in trustworthiness ratings.

a. The Supreme Court had ratings of 69%, 65%, and 68% for the three surveys.

b. The Office of the President obtained a majority rating of 59% in the pre-December 89 survey but went down to a low plurality of 36% in the current survey.

c. Congress as a whole obtained a low plurality of 38% in the Pre-December survey and further declined to 30% for the Senate and 23% for the House of Representatives in the current survey.

d. The Integrated National Police, which was then considered separate from the then Philippine Constabulary, got a majority rating of 56% in the pre-December 89 survey but went down to 24% in the current survey.

e. The downward trends are also true for barangay officials (35-30-21%) and local government officials (29-27-11%) for the three surveys.

3. The generally low trust on political parties in the past two surveys further degenerated in the current survey. In the pre-August 87 survey, the political party as a whole rated 16%. The pre-December 89 survey had 14% rating for both the Liberal Party and Nacionalista Party. The very low esteem for political parties appears to have reached to a high norm in the current survey as shown in the ratings of specific political parties: Liberal Party (9%); Nacionalista Party (7%); Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (6%); and Partido ng Demokratikong Pilipino (5%).

4. The decline in trust perception also affects most severely the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines. Obtaining a plurality of 35% in the pre-December 89 survey, the embassy shows decline in military esteem to a level of norm at 9% in the current survey. For obvious nationalistic reasons, this seems to confirm the respondents' dissatisfaction in the U.S. direct involvement in the December 1989 coup attempt.

5. The general decline in trust perceptions does not only affect civilian institutions but also other institutions that represent the major threat groups. The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) which represents the military rebels also suffer decline in trust ratings from a plurality of 37% in the pre-December 89 survey to a low of 13% in the current survey. The same is true with the CPP-NPA and the MNLF whose ratings of 3 to 4% in the past surveys have gone down to less than 1% in the current survey.

Trustworthiness of

Personalities

Decline in trustworthiness also seems to prevail in the comparison of selected personalities through the three surveys (see table 7.3).

1. Defense and military personalities, although registering large majorities in the past two surveys have declined to mere majorities in the current survey. As Chief of Staff in the pre-August 87 survey, Ramos got a trust rating of 76%. As Secretary of National Defense in the latest two surveys, he went down in trust ratings to 65 and 50%. Similarly, Ileto had 74% trust rating as Secretary of National Defense in the pre-August 87 survey which went down to 50% as National Security Adviser in the current survey. De Villa, as Chief of Staff in the latest two surveys, had 72% trust in the pre-December survey but went down to 58% in the current survey. Similarly, Biazon's trust ratings went down from 61 to 47% during the same period.

2. Aquino as President was trusted highly by about two-thirds of the respondents in the early two surveys (69 and 64%), but this dwindled down to less than two-fifths in the current survey (39%).

3. Other government personalities also suffer declines in trust ratings. Salonga as Senate President went down from 54 to 42% in the last two surveys; Maceda as the Senate's Defense Committee Chairman from 44 to 32%; and Mitra as House Speaker from 39 to 19%.

4. As with administration officials, opposition leaders in government also register decline in trust ratings. Enrile as Senate Minority Leader had large majority ratings of 67 and 65% in the first two surveys but went down to 26% in the current survey. Laurel as Vice-President had trust rating of 53% in the pre-December survey but went down to 16% in the current survey.

5. Honasan who represents the military rebel faction had a majority trust rating of 50% in the pre-December survey but went down to 22% in the current survey.

7.12 The Opportunity to Intervene

Positive support for civil control may be apparent in comparing the current survey with the past two surveys of the military. As in the previous chapter, the survey conducted in April-May 1987 is referred to as the first or pre-August 87 survey; the survey in April-May 1988, the second or pre-December 89 survey; and the current survey in October 1992-January 1992 as the third or post-December 92 survey.

Perceptions of

Government

Although disenchantment with the civil government is apparent in the previous chapters, positive perceptions for civil control seem to dominate the following responses (see table 7.1):

1. Less percentage of respondents agree that there is a big possibility that Filipinos will completely lose faith in the peaceful means of promoting democracy in the country. From 61% agreement response in the pre-December 89 survey, it went down to 44% in the post-December 89 survey.

2. An initial upward trend that followed a drastic decline in percentages of respondents' perceptions are registered during the three surveys on two essential issues.

a. The first issue is on the statement, "To prevent the communists from overthrowing our government, the military itself may temporarily takeover the government in the Philippines." The pre-August 87 survey had an agreement response of 43%. It rose to 62% in the pre-December 92 survey, then drastically went down to 24% in the post-December 92 survey.

b. A similar pattern is evident in the statement that, " If the head of government is often unable to perform his duties properly, any group in the military has reason to try unseating him even if this means using armed force." From an agreement response of 34% in the pre-August 87 survey, it rose to 37% in the pre-December 92 survey, and then severely declined to 14% in the post-December 92 survey.

Perceptions of the Political

Leadership: Major

Grievances

Another evidence of support for civil control is shown in the changes of respondents' perceptions on some 11 major grievances against the political leadership accounted in the pre- and post-December surveys. As shown in Table 6-5, three of the 11 grievance items register an increase of percentage agreement, while the other eight items record a decrease indicating a positive support of the political leadership:

1. The three items that register percentage increases consist of: graft and corruption in government (78 to 86%); weak and indecisive leadership (66 to 75%); and low salary (44 to 64%).

2. The other eight items include: inadequate services to soldiers' family (76 to 68%); inadequate military supplies and equipment (81 to 58%); lack of trust by government officials on the military (62 to 54%); presence of communists in government (62 to 52%); favoritism in military promotions (62 to 51%); too strict human rights policy against the military (68 to 49%); and weak and indecisive military leadership (51 to 44%).

As in the previous section, a pattern of military disenchantment on the performance of the civil government is initially evident. On the other hand, a positive support for civil control among the respondents is manifesting itself particularly in the current survey. In fact, the negative view on political intervention by the military has reached to a level of a norm (14%) even to the point where the head of state is incompetent.

The above results seem to indicate not only disenchantment but widespread skepticism in the perceptions of respondents as shown by their distrust not only in civilian government institutions but in almost all institutions as well. Feelings of general anxiety and hopelessness appear to pervade among the respondents.

4.13 PMA Officers Identify Themselves

with Metro Manila Residents

How do the perceptions of PMA respondents compare with the Filipinos nationwide or with those in Metro Manila on the same issues?

Some issues in this study's survey, which was conducted on October 1990 to January 1991, may be compared with those of the national and Metro Manila surveys of the Social Weather Stations (SWS) particularly one conducted in November 1990.

Comparing the margins of satisfaction of key institutions in these surveys during the period reveals the following (table 7.6):

1. The respondents in this study rate three institutions with negative margins of performance satisfaction: the National Administration (-68%), the Senate (-21%), and the House of Representatives (-27%).

2. Similarly, residents in Metro Manila also show dissatisfaction of the performance of these institutions with about the same ratings as the respondents of this study: the National Administration (-42%), the Senate (-21%), and the House of Representatives (-27%).

3. Filipinos nationwide generally differ from both the PMA officers and the Metro Manila residents in their perceptions of these institutions: the National Administration (-9%), the Senate (+2%), and the House of Representatives (+3%).

Analysis of the responses of PMA officers seems to indicate that they identify more with the sentiments of Metro Manila residents than those of the nation at large.

This observation is further proved by a comparison of responses between the two sets of respondents on a vital question: Do the complaints of rebels soldiers have basis in fact?

Both the PMA officers and Metro Manila residents share about the same sentiments of agreement as shown by their majority responses in about all of the question items. Also, their responses to the question items are closely related as indicated by their single-digit difference ratings (see table 7.7).

The previous question is then followed by a crucial question: Do the complaints of rebels soldiers justify a coup?

The response of Metro Manila residents to this question is compared not only to all the PMA respondents but also to respondents by specific branch of service and rank (see table 7.8):

1. Three out of ten Metro Manila residents (30%) agree that the complaints of rebel soldiers justify a coup, while two-thirds (67%) disagree. On the other hand, only about two out of ten PMA officers (22%) agree to the question item, while three out of ten officers (30%) disagree. Although both sets of respondents are generally opposed to a coup, it seems that there are more Metro Manila residents who are disgruntled than PMA officers as indicated by more of them favoring a coup.

2. Among the officers by branch of service and ranks, the following show scores above the all-PMA officers ratings of 22% in favor of coup: the first lieutenants (30%) and the second lieutenants, and the officers of the Philippine Air Force (29%) and the Philippine Army (24%).

3. Crosstabulation by rank and branch of service make possible the identification of the group of officers with inclination toward a coup particularly those with ratings above the average Metro Manila residents of 30%. Obtaining these ratings are generally young officers: the first lieutenants (33%) and the second lieutenants (56%) of the Philippine Air Force, the first lieutenants (35%) of the Philippine Army, and the first lieutenants of the Philippine Navy (33%). Special attention may be given to these groups by way of addressing their grievances and, thus, weaken their disposition toward political intervention.

7.2 Survey Results vis-a-vis Other Studies

on Civil-Military Relations

The survey findings suggest a decreasing civil and performance legitimacy of the political regime. Consequently, the role and influence of the military have tended to increase resulting in its politicization. Specifically, perceptions of decreasing regime legitimacy have given the military the disposition and opportunity for a more substantive political role to include attempts of some military factions for direct military intervention.

More specifically, the findings suggest that the politicization of the military is caused by factors both internal and external to the military. These influencing factors include: (1) the growing politicization of the society since 1946; (2) the overpoliticized society under the Marcos and Aquino regimes; and (3) the lack of shared civil-military values.

Despite military politicization, however, the findings also imply a trend toward a decrease in the disposition and opportunity for military intervention that augurs well for future civil-military relations.

7.21 The Overpoliticization of

Society

Like other developing states after World War II, the Philippines has exhibited a trend toward mass politicization. Government policies and programs encouraged the political involvement of its citizens that, thus, politicized all sectors of the society including the military.

Consistent with this is a view that developing states, whether under authoritarian or competitive democratic rule, has common and fundamental characteristic of open political coercion that distinguishes it from the capitalist democratic Western countries. Because of the use of open violence and confrontation in the political process, developing states may be termed as an "overpoliticized state" to distinguish it from the more politically stable capitalist democratic state.

The use of the term "overpoliticized" state is preferred to "politicized" state. This is to avoid confusion considering that there is no society or state without politics. Every state is politicized because political competition is involved. To say that a developing state is "politicized" does not truly reflect its nature. Thus, it is more accurate to describe a developing state as an overpoliticized state to distinguish it from the capitalist democratic Western state.

Sangmpan identifies open political coercion as:

The Philippines may be considered as an overpoliticized state particularly in recent years because of its traumatic political experience in the democratic transition process.

7.22 Democratic Transitions

An analysis of democratic transitions from authoritarian rule of countries in Southern Europe, Latin America and East Asia could draw valuable insights to the Philippine experience.

Effective democratic transition from authoritarian rule is generally characterized by incrementalism and compromise. Dahl urged that the surest way to polyarchy (pluralistic democracy) is through incrementalism and allowing opponents to provide "mutual guarantees." O'Donnel, Schmitter and Whitehead in their analysis of democratic transitions from authoritarian rule of countries in Southern Europe and Latin America also advocated a "play it safe" attitude characterized by moderation of demands. Another study of democratic transition and consolidation, which included Southeast Asia and the Philippines, also advised moderation and the "prior negotiation of a compromise or pact between the moderate elements of the regime and 'loyal forces' of the opposition."

These experiences of the democratic transitions in Spain, Brazil and Portugal seem to bear this out. In a case study of the Spanish transition, Maravall and Santamaria noted that the key element to the success of the Spanish transition was the "mediating and conciliatory" role of Adolfo Suarez. By focusing on consensus building, Suarez made possible the "support for the constitution", the legitimation of parties." Similarly, Cardoso argued that the Brazilian transition "required compromise and calls for tolerance." In fact, it is noted that to consolidate a postauthoritarian democracy, demands must not only be moderated but they must be phased or queued. This means that, like the tasks in an assembly line, one set of tasks must be completed before another even begins. Summarizing the theme in the collection's case studies, Karl concludes, "a central task for the designers of a new democracy is to limit the uncertainty of the political transition and the subsequent democratization to facilitate...compromise." Limiting the uncertainty of democracy of the transition can be done not merely by phasing out but also by circumscribing the agenda of demands.

The Portuguese transition is a case in which the demands for change were neither moderate, nor phased, nor circumscribed. Thus, the revolutionary attempts to redistribute property provoked reprisals. Ultimately, the proponents of radical change were driven out. Soares was able to work out a textbook example of mutual guarantees. Thus, the Portugal experience provides a case study in which the dramatic redistributions of property were postponed, circumscribed or rolled back. On the other hand, Bolivia's failed transition shows how political democracy can be threatened even by the suspicion of radical change despite Suazo's attraction of a broad coalition of supporters.

Wurfel initially described President Marcos' regime established in September 1972 by martial law declaration as bureaucratic authoritarianism that later shifted to a more traditional neo-patrimonialism which sought legitimacy not "through policy but by centralizing patronage, even in the military. Marcos attempted liberalization by declaring a policy of normalization and calling for legislative elections in 1978. The assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983, however, resulted in an economic and political crises. With the decline in the regime legitimacy and the pressure from the United States to renew his mandate, Marcos scheduled a new presidential election in 1985. Marcos believed he could win the election with his popularity and a divided opposition. Within hours of the deadline of the filing of candidacy, however, Laurel agreed to give way to Aquino by running as her vice-president with the assurance that he would be named as prime minister and foreign minister. Thus, an opposition 'pact' was forged which started the road from liberalization to democratization. Another 'pact' was made with the reformist military under the leadership of Enrile and Honasan which provided Aquino security during the electoral campaign. This coalition was strengthened when after the election, Enrile and Honasan, later joined by Ramos, launched a coup and triggered a people-power revolution that finally culminated in the exile of Marcos and installation of Aquino as President.

Aquino's initial policies upon taking over were apparently not in accord with the democratic transitions in other countries. As in the Portugal case, these policies were neither moderate, phased nor circumscribed. Installed by a coalition of forces that included the Catholic Church, moderate opposition groups and reformist military faction, Aquino opted for immediate radical changes. In an attempt to weed out Marcos influences, she declared a revolutionary government, abolished the legislative assembly, and replaced elected local officials. Ruling by decree, she appointed the members of the Constitutional Commission to draft a new Constitution.

7.23 Gap in Civil-Military Values

As indicated in the survey, the military set of core values includes: a high regard for political order and economic development, a serious concern for internal security particularly on the threat posed by communist insurgency, and a strong drive against corruption. The military has basically three goals: the maintenance of order and stability, a strong anti-communist insurgency campaign, and minimization of government corruption. These values and goals may be compared to those of the civil government during the democratic transition.

The past administration's policies apparently diverged to a certain extent from these aims. While the military leadership desired a major campaign against the communist insurgents, the civilian government opted for the release of and negotiation with the top communist leaders. Also, the military felt that its autonomy and corporate interests were threatened by the administration's initial lack of budgetary support as well as the strict human rights policy against military offenders. Further, while the military and particularly the junior officers desired a strong anti-corruption drive, the administration was perceived to be helpless in minimizing graft and corruption in government. As a result, the military felt that the political order and stability were being seriously threatened.

In short, the foundation of civilian control was eroded as military prerogatives were challenged, as politicization of the military increased, and as military recognition of civilian authority weakened.

7.1 Summary of Findings

1. Respondents' profile

The profile of the respondents generally indicates: a middle-class socioeconomic background, having parents with largely some college education, and having close relatives who are also serving in the military establishment.

2. Regime legitimacy

The survey findings reveal that the civil and performance legitimacy of the regime are generally low. This low regime legitimacy is indicated by: (a) generally low trustworthy and performance ratings of its institutions and personalities, particularly the executive and legislative branches of government; (b) relatively justified grievances involving graft and corruption in government, corrupt politicians, weak and indecisive leadership, inadequate military budgetary support, and breakdown of basic services; and (c) widespread dissatisfaction of the performance of the political leadership on issues such as land reform, fighting graft and corruption, responding quickly to national problems,

minimizing crime, fighting the insurgency movements, and responding to what the people want.

In contrast with the civilian government, the personalities and institutions related to the military (the DND and AFP) receive higher trust and performance ratings.

3. The disposition to intervene

The survey findings suggest a disposition for political intervention. This is apparent in the respondents' motive and mood to protect the national interest as well as its own corporate and individual self-interests.

Regarding the national interest, the respondents indicate a core value emphasizing national security and order. Thus, they are deeply anxious of their primary role of preserving national security, with internal security threats being more salient than external threats. They believe that national development is not possible without national security. In fact, they are considered as both sides of the same coin; one cannot exist without the other. Thus, an almost equal concern is exhibited for national development issues such as: improvement in peace and order, sustained economic growth, less graft and corruption, better administration of justice, greater political stability, and more equitable distribution of wealth.

They are also confident of their capabilities in performing not only their primary security role but also other functions that may be assigned to them. These functions range from neutralizing the armed communist and Muslim rebels to competence of senior military officers to handle civilian offices. The confidence of handling non-military tasks is a product of their broad education and experience. Most senior military officers have graduate degrees from prestigious schools here and abroad. Their exposure to civic action tasks, usually in cooperation with local officials, in counter-insurgency assignments in the field also contributes to this confidence.

The respondents' concern for their corporate autonomy is evident in their demands for noninterference of politicians from exerting influence beyond Constitutional and legal provisions. They also need more budgetary support and provisions for logistical and personnel salary needs.

Although an apparent semblance of homogeneity among the respondents is shown, the findings also indicate heterogeneity in perceptions particularly between the senior and junior ranks. This indicator of self-division suggests a tendency toward a disposition and capacity to intervene.

4. The opportunity to intervene

In contrast with a marked disposition to intervene, the respondents believe that the opportunity or occasion for political intervention is not favorable. As discussed in section 5.1 military, political and economic conditions are not suited for military intervention. Also, this is shown by an apparent support for civil control despite perceptions of low regime legitimacy. The respondents have a strong commitment to protect the government against those who want to overthrow it; that is, even to the point where the head of government is unable to do his duties properly.

5. Correlation of variables

Statistical tests involving chi-square and gamma are used to find out the strength and direction of key variables. The results show varied relationships of these variables: a strong positive correlation between civil and performance legitimacy, a moderate positive correlation between regime legitimacy and the disposition to intervene, a moderate negative correlation between regime legitimacy and the opportunity to intervene, and a moderate negative correlation between the disposition and opportunity to intervene.

The results confirm the low civil and performance legitimacy of the Aquino regime. Although the respondents are disposed to intervene, they also perceive that prevailing conditions simply are not suited for military intervention.

8.2 Summary of Implications

1. Survey results vis-a-vis

other military surveys

This study is compared with previous two military survey studies conducted immediately before the August 1987 coup and before the December 1989 coup. The three surveys further confirm the above findings of low regime legitimacy and high disposition to intervene. Comparatively, military perceptions of regime legitimacy further declined in the current survey. Disenchantment with civilian government becomes more serious as evident by: (a) lower trust and performance ratings of its institutions and personalities, (b) a view that increasing incompetence and corruption of local officials are behind the growth of insurgency, and (c) declining confidence for a firm and decisive leadership.

On the other hand, the findings of the three surveys support the view that the opportunity for military intervention is not present. Primarily, there is a more positive view toward the internal security threats as evident by declining perception that many high government officials are leftists or communist sympathizers. As a result, a growing support for civil control is manifested. There is more faith for peaceful means of promoting democracy. Also, there is more support for the head of government against any military group that tries to unseat him. This support is bestowed even if the reason behind such move is the leader's incompetence or the threat of communist takeover.

2. Survey results vis-a-vis

The respondents identify themselves with Metro Manila residents than the rest of the population. This is indicated by comparing this survey with the Social Weather Stations' national and Metro Manila surveys during the same period. Being in the political, economic and cultural capital of the country, Metro Manila residents set the trends for the nation in many aspects. Similarly, the respondents have acquired the values of Metro Manila residents considering their exposure to urban living here and abroad.

3. Survey results vis-a-vis related studies

Although the opportunity to intervene is low, the trend toward a highly politicized role of the military is evident. Three factors generally influence military politicization: the growing politicization of the society since 1946, the overpoliticized society under the Marcos and Aquino regimes, and divergent civil-military values.

The highly politicized

third world state

It is considered that there is no society or state without politics. Every state is politicized because political competition is involved. However, Third World states tend to be more politicized or "overpoliticized" as compared to the democratic capitalist Western states. Third World states, whether under authoritarian or competitive democratic rule, have common structural characteristics such as: the use of open violence and confrontation in the political process, the pervasive role of the state in managing the activities of the society, and the lack of equalization of opportunities. The Philippines has exhibited the manifestations of a highly overpoliticized state. Although nominal or fairly democratic pluralistic institutions have been established in recent years, the country has experienced intense and persistent political crisis including coup attempts, leftist rebellion, and a secessionist movement.

Overpoliticization due to

abrupt democratization

An analysis of democratic transitions from authoritarian rule of countries in Southern Europe, Latin America and East Asia could draw valuable insights to the Philippine experience. Based on the experiences of these countries, successful democratic transition and consolidation follow an incremental, moderate and compromising path. The Aquino administration, however, preferred immediate radical changes by declaring a revolutionary government, doing away with the Constitution, abolishing the legislature, and replacing local government officials.

Successful democratic transition also involves adherence to pacts agreed upon by the democratic coalition forces. Aquino set aside "pacts" formally and informally agreed upon particularly with dominant forces that brought her to power, which included the Laurel and the Enrile-RAM factions. The alienation of the latter group as well as the inability to build consensus with the pro-Marcos group resulted in the series of coup attempts against her administration.

Gap in civil-military

values

The severe tensions in civil-military relations are mainly caused by the lack of shared values between the political leadership and the military. Primarily, serious differences in counterinsurgency policies against communist rebels followed. The military wanted a strong campaign against communist insurgents. However, the political leadership was perceived by the military to be favoring the leftist and communist groups. This perception was based on the regime's appointment of known leftist leaders to political positions and the initiation of a peace negotiation with the communist. Despite strong objection of defense and military leaders, Aquino directed the release from detention of top communist leaders. Also, the regime was perceived to be antagonistic to the military corporate and individual interests. While the military sought professional autonomy, the political leadership directed the human rights investigations of members of the military. Further, the military requested the civilian authorities for better equipment and pay. But this appeal was generally ignored until after the August 1987 coup attempt when the military received increases in budget and pay.

8.3 Conclusion

The study reveals much tension prevailing in current civil-military relations. It is posited that low regime legitimacy provides the disposition and opportunity for military intervention. This argument is tested through a perception survey of the PMA-trained officers.

The survey findings, analyses and implications generally indicate: (a) a low civil and performance legitimacy; (b) a disposition to intervene as result of strong grievances against the civilian regime; and (c) a lack of opportunity to intervene based on prevailing military, political, and economic conditions.

To conclude, this question may be posed: How does this study contribute to the literature and theory of civil-military relations?

An attempt toward a new perspective in civil-military relations is presented in this study. Addressing the particular issue of strained relationship between the civilian government and the military, this study focuses on the effects of regime legitimacy on military intervention. Some writers discuss the implications of these two concepts separately. As mentioned in section 1.72, Agpalo wrote on regime legitimacy while Finer presented an extensive discussion on military intervention. Other writers, like Nordlinger and Crouch, suggest that a regime's inability to govern could lead to military intervention. However, it seems that this is the first time that a specific inquiry on the effects of low legitimacy on military intervention is attempted. By linking the above concepts of regime legitimacy (Friedrich and Agpalo's) and military intervention (Finer's), a distinct framework on the understanding of civil-military tensions is presented. Thus, it could be said that this study is a "most original contribution to the literature on the military in politics among the Third World countries."

8.4 Recommendations

The fifth major questions posed in the introductory part of this study are: What policy measures might be considered to enhance civil-military relations? How can civil control be enhanced ideally with voluntary, military support?

Enhancement of civil-military relations and support for civil control must address the factors that are exogenous and endogenous to the military. This approach would primarily involve specific measures that would lessen the disposition and opportunity of military intervention.

The disposition to intervene involves two aspects: motive and mood. Lessening the motive or will to intervene requires addressing the problems that would endanger not only the nation's interest but also the military's corporate and individual self-interest. Also, dampening the mood to intervene involves immediately attending to the grievances and frustrations because of serious perceived threats to these interests. Lessening the opportunity to intervene would involve addressing overt and latent domestic crisis and the resulting power vacuum that could invite the military to intervene.

A primary reason involving the military disposition and opportunity to intervene in politics is regime legitimacy. Addressing this major factor could enhance civil-military relations and civil control.

How can regime legitimacy be enhanced? A credible regime legitimacy would require a more enlightened and responsive political leadership. In turn, this leadership could adopt two general measures: (a) a gradual, incremental and consensual approach in the ongoing process of democratic transition and consolidation; and (b) achieving a high degree of convergence of civil-military values.

1. Incremental, moderate and

consensual democratization

It is recommended that the regime, during the ongoing process of democratic transition and consolidation, follow an incremental, moderate and consensual approach. It may be noted that this approach was adopted by the recent successful democracies in Southern Europe, Latin America and East Asia.

This means that the political leadership involves itself toward a coalition-building by consolidating its own resources and

seeking out alliances with other groups in government and society.

It is noteworthy that the current Ramos administration, as an initial step toward political stability, is inclined to follow this incrementalist approach. The regime's basic policy toward coalition-building is apparent when it reached out to the political opposition. Also, negotiations and offers of amnesty have been extended to the military rebels, the communist insurgents, and the Muslim secessionists.

2. A high degree of convergence in

civil-military values

It is suggested that the political and military leadership adopt measures toward a high-degree of convergence of civil-military values. Such measures would involve: (a) the creation of a more conservative environment that is more sympathetic to the military, and (b) the drawing away of the obstacles that tend to create fear of military power and anti-military bias of the liberal ethic.

Specifically, it would involve an internal change in the military that could lessen its politicization through an adoption of a more enlightened military professionalism. Based on the concept of more militarization and more civilianization, this approach seeks a convergence of traditional military and democratic civilian values in the military professional.

This fusion is based on the fact that military and civilian values are not exclusive of each other. The trend toward shared civilian-military values is more imperative in developing countries. This is based on the inherent overpoliticization of third world societies and the pervasive nature of socio-political and technological developments in the world today.

The new military professional is considered as more than unconditional servants or simply paid up employees of the state. Primarily, it would be a military "that demand of civilian authorities that there be 'institutions worth dying for.'"

A closer civil-military relation would require military officers to be more politically aware but respectful of civilian political leadership. Specifically, this may be achieved through: (a) a socialization and indoctrination that focus on civil primacy as the "natural order," (b) maximizing autonomy and corporateness and respect for the chain of command, and (c) inculcating a moral value formation that allows the convergence of both secular and spiritual norms.

Civil-military cohesion, therefore, would involve military officers acquiring political awareness, understanding and expertise; a sense of realistic and enlightened corporate interest; and the traditional professional perspective.

The concept of more civilianization and more militarization also extends to the functional and structural set-up of the military. Functionally, this means a return to the primary role of the military: defense against foreign threats. It is noteworthy that the civilian and military officials are addressing this concern. With decreased insurgent threat, the Philippine National Police is being tasked to take over the counterinsurgency campaign. The military, in turn, is focusing on the modernization of its weaponry and equipment to serve as strong deterrent against foreign threats. External defense becomes imperative as a result of the military vacuum generated with the pull-out of the United States military forces from Philippine bases.

Structurally, this concept involves a joint civilian-military undertaking of military support functions such as logistics, intelligence and communications based at the Department of National Defense.

All of these measures are aimed toward one goal: political stability. Without it, national unity and progress are not possible. During this period of democratic transition and consolidation, two approaches toward political stability are crucial: consensual democratization and civil-military cohesion. The alternative, as what happened during the previous administration, is a strained civilian-military relations that could lead to direct military interventions.

TABLE 1.2

FREQUENCY RATING SCALE

TABLE 2.1

OFFICER PROBABLY INVOLVED (OPI) IN THE DECEMBER 1989 COUP:

PMA or Non-PMA

Source: The Fact-Finding Commission, The Final Report, p. 441

TABLE 3.1

RESPONDENTS BY RANK AND SERVICE

TABLE 3.2

RESPONDENTS BY AGE

TABLE 3.3

RESPONDENTS BY LENGTH OF MILITARY SERVICE

TABLE 3.4

BIRTHPLACE BY REGION

(in Percentages)

TABLE 3.5

RESPONDENTS BY GRADUATE EDUCATION

TABLE 3.6

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF PARENTS

TABLE 3.7

PARENTS WITH COLLEGE AND GRADUATE EDUCATION

(In Percentages)

TABLE 3.8

RESPONDENTS WITH RELATIVES IN THE MILITARY

TABLE 3.9

TRUSTWORTHINESS OF INSTITUTIONS:

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

(In Percentages)

TABLE 3.10

TRUSTWORTHINESS OF PERSONALITIES:

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

(In Percentages)

TABLE 3.11

TRUSTWORTHINESS OF INSTITUTIONS:

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

(In Percentages)

TABLE 3.12

TRUSTWORTHINESS OF INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONALITIES:

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHIL.

(In Percentages)

TABLE 3.13

AQUINO PROBABLY WON IN THE 1986

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

(In Percentages)

1. By Branches of Service

2. By Rank

TABLE 3.14

APPOINTING RATHER THAN ELECTING THE 48 COMMISSIONERS

OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WAS PROPER

(In Percentages)

1. By Branches of Service

2. By Rank

TABLE 3.15

PMA OFFICERS' RESPONSES IN THE 1987

CONSTITUTIONAL PLEBISCITE

(In Percentages)

1. By Branches of Service

2. By Rank

TABLE 3.16

1987 PLEBISCITE RESULTS IN PREDOMINANTLY

MILITARY VOTERS' PRECINCTS

TABLE 3.17

PERFORMANCE SATSFACTION OF INSTITUTIONS:

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

(In Percentages)

TABLE 3.18

PERFORMANCE SATISFACTION OF PERSONALITIES:

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

(In Percentages)

TABLE 3.19

PERFORMANCE SATISFACTION OF INSTITUTIONS:

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

(In Percentages)

TABLE 3.20

PERFORMANCE SATISFACTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONALITIES:

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHIL.

(In Percentages)

TABLE 3.21

PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT:

NATIONAL PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

(In Percentages)

TABLE 3.21

(Continuation)

TABLE 4.1

IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENTAL CONCERNS

(In Percentages)

TABLE 4.2

PERCEPTIONS OF CAPABILITIES AND SELF-ESTEEM

(In Percentages)

TABLE 4.3

PERCEPTIONS OF LEADERSHIP AND MORALE

(In Percentages)

TABLE 4.4

PERCEPTIONS OF AUTONOMY AND PROFESSIONALISM

(In Percentages)

TABLE 4.5

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: MAJOR GRIEVANCES

(In Percentages)

TABLE 4.6

MAJOR GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION